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PART I:  BIOGRAPHY 
Chief Justice John Roberts was born on January 7, 1955 in Buffalo, New York to 
Rosemary nee Podrasky and John Glover “Jack” Roberts, Sr.1  Jack Roberts, Sr. worked as a 
plant manager with Bethlehem Steel.2  When John Roberts was in the fourth grade, Jack Roberts 
was transferred to Long Beach, Indiana to build the new Bethlehem Steel Mill in Burns Harbor, 
Indiana. John Roberts, his parents, and his three sisters, Cathy, Peggy, and Barbara, lived in a 
small summer cottage for several years before building a new split level home a few blocks away 
in Long Beach, Indiana.3  Jack Roberts, Sr. provided a stable, comfortable life for his family.4 
The Chief Justice was born and raised a Roman Catholic.5  Roberts attended both private 
Catholic elementary and high schools.6  In 1973, Roberts graduated from La Lumiere School, a 
Roman Catholic boarding school.7  While at the La Lumiere School, Roberts obtained a classical 
education, studying Latin and French.8  He excelled at these subjects and was well respected 
among his peers and teachers.9  From an early age, Roberts built a reputation as a brilliant mind.  
Teachers often tested their methods out on him.10  If Roberts could not understand their methods 
the first time around, the teachers would alter them accordingly.11  Adept at math, writing, and 
rhetoric, Roberts far surpassed his other classmates.12  Additionally, Roberts excelled in athletics 
                                                 
1 See Todd S. Purdum, Jodi Wilgoren, Pam Belluck, Court Nominee’s Life Is Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law , 
The New York Times, 2 (July 21, 2005) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/21/politics/21nominee.html?ex=1279598400&en=c055515d290a3215&ei=5090&
partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&_r=0. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
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and other extracurricular activities.13  He was captain of the football team, competed in wrestling 
and track, and participated in the school drama productions.14 
Roberts reaped the financial benefits of his father’s executive position, attending private 
school and living in a wealthy neighborhood.  However, Jack Roberts, Sr. instilled some valuable 
life lessons in the Chief Justice, including the importance of hard work and the plight of the less 
fortunate.  Roberts and his childhood friend, John Langley, worked at Burns Harbor steel mill 
during summer recess.15  While Jack Roberts, Sr. worked in his cushy business office, young 
John Roberts worked on the floor with the regular employees.16  He interacted with those less 
fortunate than him, many of whom would never attend college.17  This experience epitomizes 
what many commend him for:  his modesty and work ethic. 
When it came time to choose a college, the Chief Justice debated Amherst or Harvard.18  
Amherst seemed like an ideal choice for his original professional aspirations of becoming a 
history professor.19  Ultimately, the Chief Justice attended Harvard College.  Roberts majored in 
history and distinguished himself academically.  In 1976, he graduated summa cume laude.  
Interestingly, in spite of his father’s moderate wealth, Roberts continued to work in the steel 
mills every summer to pay for his private education tuition.20 
A true Harvard man, the Chief Justice attended Harvard Law School.21  Roberts proved to 
his colleagues and professors that he was a brilliant legal mind as a member and managing editor 
                                                 
13 See id. at 3. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See John G. Roberts, Jr., The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law (Sept. 10, 2014) 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr. 
21 See Purdum, supra. at 3. 
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of the Harvard Law Review.22  Fellow students and friends at Harvard Law acknowledged that 
Roberts possessed conservative ideologies, but none labeled him politically conservative.23  
Rather, many considered his conservatism to be more akin to an “old-fashion” philosophy.24  
Roberts had a respect for institutions and history, which tempered his revolutionary thinking.25  
As post-Vietnam era political upheaval lingered, Roberts was more concerned with honing his 
legal skills instead of picketing the White House.26   In 1979, Roberts graduated from Harvard 
Law magna cume laude.27 
After being admitted to the bar, Roberts served as a law clerk for Judge Henry Friendly 
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and then Justice William 
Rehnquist.28  Judge Friendly also attended Harvard College and Harvard Law School.29  Judge 
Friendly took judicial precedent seriously.30  His decisions regularly sifted through earlier cases, 
distinguishing their facts in light of the legal issues argued, discerning new trends, and clarifying 
peculiar outcomes.31 
From 1980 to 1981, Roberts clerked for then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist on the 
Burger Court.32  Justice Rehnquist established himself as the most conservative of President 
Richard Nixon’s appointees, preferring a narrow view of Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment rights 
and federal power while championing expansive state powers.  Justice Rehnquist was often the 
                                                 
22 See id. 
23 See id. at 4. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 4-5. 
29 See id. 
30 See Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging , 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 3, 7 (2010). 
31 See Purdum, supra. at . 
32 See Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court, The Struggle for the Constitution , The National Law Journal, (Simon & 
Shuster 2013). 
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sole dissenter in many cases in the early days on the Burger Court. 33  However, his conservative 
views eventually became the majority view of the Court.34  Chief Justice Rehnquist utilized his 
position to significantly limit the extensive powers of Congress under the Commerce and Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.35  Roberts expounds a similar conservatism in his decisions, 
particularly with regards to federal power.36 
From 1981 to 1982, Roberts served in the Reagan administration as a Special Assistant to 
U.S. Attorney General William French Smith.  From 1982 to 1986, Roberts served as Associate 
Counsel to President Ronald Reagan under White House Counsel Fred Fielding.37  After 
practicing in the public sector, Roberts moved into private practice at Hogan & Hartson.38  While 
in private practice, Roberts argued thirty-nine times before the Supreme Court. 39  As the 
premiere Supreme Court advocate of his time, Roberts represented a range of clients and argued 
both conservative and liberal legal issues before the Court.40  His work colleagues respected him 
for his brilliant oratory skills, hard work, and modesty.41 
After Roberts practiced at Hogan & Hartson for several years, he eventually returned to 
the public sector to serve in the George H. W. Bush Administration as Principal Deputy Solicitor 
General from 1989 to 1993 and as Assistant to Acting Solicitor General Kenneth Starr.42  Under 
Starr’s advisement, Roberts tackled many controversial issues, including the legality of 
                                                 
33 See Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court, 221 (1979). 
34 See id. 
35 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil damages provision in the Violence 
Against Women Act as an imposition of unwarranted congressional power in violation of the Commerce Clause).  
36 See Peter Baker, Bush Nominates Roberts as Chief Justice, Washington Post, at 2 (Sept. 6, 2005) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500173.html. 
37 See Coyle, supra. at 18-19, 21. 
38 See Purdum, supra. at 5. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Jo Becker, Work on Rights Might Illuminate Roberts’s Views, Washington Post (Sept. 8, 2005) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/07/AR2005090702394.html. 
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affirmative action programs and abortion.43  Specifically, Roberts co-wrote a brief arguing that 
Roe. v. Wade should be overturned.44  Roberts handled both liberal and conservative cases and 
argued both sides with remarkable impartiality.45  Some of Roberts’ more conservative cases 
came to the forefront as the Bush administration mulled over his nomination for a justiceship.46  
Later on, during Roberts’ confirmation hearings, opponents of Roberts’ nomination argued that 
his conservative and religious views made him unsuitable for the Supreme Court.47 
In May 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Roberts for the position of judge for 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.48  From 2001 through 2003, Roberts authored 49 
opinions, which provoked two dissents from other judges and authored three dissents of his 
own.49  Roberts exhibited the makings of a prominent, effective legal mind, expressing modesty 
and restraint, while displaying brilliant oratory and writing skills.50 
The Chief Justice has maintained ties to the Republican Party, specifically to President 
G.W. Bush.  On September 16, 2005, President George Bush nominated Roberts for the position 
of Chief Justice.51  Roberts’ nomination sought to guarantee the continuance of Bush’s influence 
on the judiciary long after Bush left the White House.52  At age 50, Roberts was the youngest 
Chief Justice since John Marshall, giving Roberts decades to shape the court’s direction.53  On 
                                                 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See Coyle, supra. at 21 
46 See id. at 21-22. 
47 See id. at 22. 
48 See Oyez Project, supra. 
49 See Oyez Project, supra. 
50 See Lawrence Tribe and Joshua Matz, Uncertain Justice:  The Roberts Court and The Constitution , 8 (Henry Holt 
2014). 
51 See Peter Baker, Bush Nominates Roberts as Chief Justice, Washington Post, at 1 (Sept. 6, 2005) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500173.html. 
52 See id. at 1. 
53 See id. (Chief Justice John Marshall was appointed to Chief Justice in 1801). 
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September 5, 2005, two days after the death of former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Roberts 
was confirmed.54 
During Roberts’ confirmation hearings, he articulated his judicial philosophy and his 
faithfulness to stare decisis. 55  Roberts stated that he preferred to be remembered as a modest 
judge, as someone who appreciated his limited role as judge and who applied the law in a way 
that benefitted the legal system as a whole.56   Roberts sought to build consensus around narrow 
opinions that did not decide any more than each case required out.57  Roberts stated, 
Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.  
The role of the umpire and a judge is critical to make sure everybody plays 
by the rules.  But it is a limited role.  Nobody ever went to a ball game to 
see the umpire…And I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and 
strikes, and not to pitch or bat.58 
On October 3, 2005, the first term of the Robert’s Court began.59  Roberts set out with the intent 
to continue the legacy of his successor as Umpire of the court.60 
Roberts is aptly considered a conservative justice and decides cases in accordance with a 
conservative judicial philosophy.61  Roberts grew up in a strict Catholic household and continues 
to practice as a devout Catholic, but he keeps that aspect of his life private and apart from his 
legal career.62  His religious background illuminates his conservative leanings, but his Catholic 
upbringing does not overpower his judicial philosophy.63   
                                                 
54 See Id. 
55 See Coyle, supra. at 22. 
56 See ibid. at 23. 
57 See id. at 24 
58 See id. at 23. 
59 See id. at 26. 
60 See id. at 19; see also Baker, supra. at 2. 
61 See Baker, supra. at 2. 
62 See Purdum, supra. at 6. 
63 See id. 
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Similarly, his efforts to act as the Umpire remain largely unaffected by his affiliations 
with the Republican Party and right-wing ideologies.64  One does not seek a judicial nomination 
if one is not politically motivated and does intend to use his or her position to dictate the 
country’s future.  However, as Roberts encounters controversial legal issues, his opinions 
consistently articulate a judicial philosophy that falls outside of the indoctrinated influence of his 
political affiliations.65 
Rather, as the Umpire, Roberts articulates an honest, straight-shooting judicial 
philosophy that aims to stay within the bounds of controlling legal institutions.66  These 
institutions include the Constitution, judicial precedent, and the role of the Court.  Roberts holds 
firmly to his belief that the Chief Justice must act like the Umpire, he must call the strikes and 
balls fairly, objectively, and consistently within the bounds of these institutions.  While Roberts 
is not steadfastly opposed to making exceptions or creating new precedent, the Chief Justice’s 
judicial philosophy articulates the importance of tempered evolution; a slow, conservative step-
by-step evolution of the law.67  Roberts’ judicial philosophy maintains the sanctity of the 
aforesaid institutions while allowing progress in areas of law that evolve with societal standards.  
Consensus, minimalist decision-making, and adherence to judicial precedent marks Roberts’ 
tenure as the Umpire and his intent to have everyone, including the Court, play by the rules. 
PART II:  CASE ANALYSIS 
a. Article I and II Federal Powers 
i. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (Majority) 
                                                 
64 See Baker, supra. at 2 (acknowledging that Roberts has expressed in his  decisions, briefs, and oral arguments an 
opposition to more liberal issues such as affirmative action, but that many proponent’s of Roberts’ nomination 
believed that these ideologies would not inhibit him from interpreting the Constitution and carrying ou t his duties).  
65 See Purdum, supra. at 4, 6. 
66 See Baker, supra. at 2. 
67 See Coyle, supra. at 23, 24. 
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In 2012, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”).68  More specifically, it ruled on the power of the federal government to 
regulate the economy.69  Prior to the 1930’s, the Supreme Court attempted to police the federal 
government, but with the advent of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal initiative, 
the Court retreated from a more active role as police officer and deferred contested matters to the 
democratic process.70  National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, also known as 
The Health Care Case, constituted the Court’s revived attempt to police and constrain the power 
of the federal government.71   
In 2010, President Barack Obama and his Democratic allies mustered the votes necessary 
to pass the Affordable Care Act in the House and Senate.72  The ACA contains several key 
components to further its goal of providing universal insurance coverage.73  The most important 
component of the ACA and the primary component at issue in Sebelius is the “individual 
mandate”, which directs people who can afford insurance on the private market to buy a plan 
unless they otherwise received coverage under Medicaid, Medicare, or employer plans.74  The 
federal government imposed a “share responsibility payment,” levied as part of the federal 
income tax, on individuals who failed to buy insurance pursuant to this “individual mandate”.75  
                                                 
68 See Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (2014). 
69 See Tribe, supra. at 54. 
70 See id.;  see also  David  A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act , 2012 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 1 (2012) (citing cases). 
71  See Tribe, supra. at 54 (concluding that while the Roberts Court partially upheld the ACA and the federal 
government’s power to implement and carry out nat ional insurance coverage, it constrained the federal 
government’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary Proper Clause).  
72 See ibid. at 55 (The Senate used a special budgetary voting procedure that required only fifty -one votes to pass 
changes House Democrats demanded.  On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the bill into law). 
73 See id. at 56-57 (discussing key components of ACA, including: (1) requiring states to expand their Medicaid 
programs; (2) providing subsidies for middle-income Americans to buy insurance; (3) creating government-run 
exchanges, on which American can shop for policies; (4) penalizing large employers who do not provide affordab le 
insurance to their employees; and (5) prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage to and charging more 
for individuals with preexisting medical conditions ). 
74 See id. at 57; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A-(a). 
75 See § 5000A-(b). 
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In spite of the ACA’s inherent complexity, the “individual mandate” provision provided two 
clear-cut choices:  pay for healthcare or pay the shared responsibility tax. 76 
On March 23, 2010, when President Obama signed the ACA into law, Florida and twelve 
other states filed a complaint with Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida.77  
Thirteen additional states, some individuals, and the National Federation of Independent 
Business joined in the lawsuit.78  The parties argued that the individual mandate exceeded 
Congress’ powers enumerated in Article I.79  The District Court agreed with the parties’ 
contentions, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part.80  On remand, the District Court 
reaffirmed its holding that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’ Article I powers.81  On 
June 28, 2012, the Roberts Court issued its ruling on in the Health Care Case.82 
Chief Justice Roberts begins his analysis by defining the Court’s role. 83  The Supreme 
Court, in Roberts’ view, does “not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies as that 
judgment is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders.84  The Court only asks whether Congress 
has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions.85  With this statement, 
                                                 
76 See Coyle, supra. at 57. 
77 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id.  
81 See id. 
82 See Coyle, supra. at 60.  Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justices Breyer and  Kagan joined in part.  
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Although not the focus of this analysis, the Court 
struck down the Medicaid expansion provision, which stripped noncompliant states of their Medicaid fund, as an 
impermissible coercion of the federal government.  The Medicaid expansion provision is not discussed in this 
comment. 
83 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2577 (Roberts, J.) 
84 See id.  
85 See id. 
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Roberts foreshadows what is to come, a revival of the court’s power to constrain federal power 
to explicitly enumerated limitations in the Constitution and existing judicial precedent.86  
Roberts’ opinion contains a recurring theme: the federal government cannot compel 
individuals to act as the government would have them act.87  In accordance with this theme, 
Roberts defines the constitutional parameters at issue in the present case.  Pursuant to Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 3, Congress can regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the states, and 
the Indian tribes.88  Roberts articulates three categories of permissible regulation, including: the 
channels of interstate commerce; persons or things in interstate commerce; and activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.89  While the third category of permissible congressional 
power can be expansive, Roberts’ tone suggests there is a limitation to such expansive power.90  
Additionally, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, Congress may lay and collect taxes to 
pay debts and provide for the defense and welfare of the country.91  Lastly, pursuant to Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 18, Congress can make laws necessary and proper for carrying out the 
aforementioned powers.92 
Roberts addresses federal power pursuant to the Commerce Clause first.  Roberts 
acknowledges that Congress has employed the Commerce Power broadly, regulating any act that 
directly affects interstate commerce and extending to any activity or amalgam of similar 
activities that substantially impact it.93  The Chief Justice and the dissent examine Wickard v. 
Filburn, the Court’s most far-reaching interpretation of the Commerce Clause, to define federal 
                                                 
86 See id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 345 (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824) for 
premise that the Constitution’s  express conferral of some powers to the federal government makes clear that it does 
not grant others and that the Federal Government may only exercise the powers granted to it by the Constitution). 
87 See id. at 2589. 
88 See U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, Cl. 3. 
89 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2578 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000)). 
90 See id. 
91 See U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, Cl. 1. 
92 See U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, Cl. 18. 
93 See id. at 2586. 
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power.94  Wickard authorized Congress to regulate a purely intrastate because the cumulative 
nature of intrastate or personal activity had substantial and “actual effects” on interstate 
commerce. 95  The government and dissent in Sebelius relies on this precedent to emphasize that 
the failure of individuals to purchase insurance has a substantial and deleterious effect on 
interstate commerce, creating a cost-shifting problem that burdens insurers and insured taxpayers 
to cover costs incurred by uninsured, unhealthy individuals.96 
In contrast, Roberts identifies a distinct limitation on congressional power that squarely 
aligns with Wickard.  Roberts stresses that the power to regulate presupposes that there is an 
existing activity to regulate, i.e., the production of wheat for personal use.97  The Commerce 
Clause does not authorize Congress to compel individuals to become active in commerce by 
purchasing an unwanted product, i.e., health insurance, because their inaction may affect 
commerce.98  Roberts cautions that “[c]onstruing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to 
regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially 
vast domain to congressional authority.”99  In contrast to the dissent, Roberts affirms that 
Wickard does not permit Congress to regulate inactivity, i.e., abstaining from purchasing health 
insurance on the open market.100 
While Roberts is careful to not use the term “slippery slope”, he imagines a state of 
unbridled congressional control, wherein the federal government uses its expansive powers to 
                                                 
94 See id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)) (The Court permitted Congress to regulate a 
farmer’s personal growth and consumption of wheat on his farm because the farmer’s personal use when taken 
together with the actions of many others similarly situated substantially affected interstate commerce); see also 
Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain , 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2012) (discussing the impact of 
Wickard v. Filburn on the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause). 
95 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119-20, 24 (overlooking what activity was being regulated and considering overall 
economic realities of farmer’s activity on interstate commerce). 
96 See id. at 2585. 
97 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (upholding Congress’ power to regulate farmer’s production of wheat for 
personal use because he exceeded his allotted quota under federal program to regulate the price of wheat). 
98 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2585. 
99 See id. at 2587. 
100 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. 
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coerce individuals to buy any product that solves any problem no matter how attenuated to 
interstate commerce.101  Just like most individuals will likely engage in markets for food, 
clothing, transportation, shelter, or energy, Roberts asserts that this fact does not authorize 
Congress to mandate that specific classes of individuals purchase particular products in those 
markets.102  Just because vegetables are good for one’s health and may prevent future sickness 
and preempt the need for insurance, this economic reality does not give Congress the power to 
mandate that individuals buy vegetables.103 
Similarly, the Government’s argument predicated on the Necessary and Proper Clause 
failed by the same logic.  Roberts’ theme of congressional restraint surfaces once again.  Roberts 
acknowledges that judicial precedent construes the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly, 
upholding laws considered “necessary” as well as “convenient”, “useful”, or “conducive” to the 
Government’s “beneficial exercises”.104  Conversely, judicial precedent also supports restraint on 
such powers, declaring improper a law that precipitates a “mere usurpation” of power by the 
federal government.105  Roberts concedes that the ACA may be “necessary” to achieve its 
intended goal of insurance reform, but it contravenes specifically enumerated federal powers and 
constitutes an improper means for achieving that goal. 106   Roberts concludes that the mandate 
grants the federal government a “great substantive and independent power”, which allows it to 
                                                 
101 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2585. 
102 See id. at 2590 (making interesting distinction between the regulation of classes of individuals and the regulation 
of classes of activities. The Government argued that because uninsured individuals actively seek out and obtain 
health insurance they are “active in the market” and are therefore subject to regulation.  Roberts contends that this 
reasoning is backwards as the mandate targets younger, healthy individuals who are less likely in need of health 
insurance.  The mandate targets a class of individuals , who not yet engaged in commerce, rather than the activity 
these individuals engage in). 
103 See id. 2590-91 (“Congress will regulate the American people from cradle to grave!”). 
104 See United States v. Comstock , 560 U.S. 126, 148-49 (2010). 
105 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997). 
106 See Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2592. 
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reach beyond its enumerated constitutional boundaries and draw within its regulatory scope those 
individuals who would otherwise fall outside of it.107 
At this point in Roberts’ opinion, it seemed as though he had made up his mind, that the 
ACA had valid goals yet far exceeded permissible federal power.  “The most straightforward 
reading of the mandate,” Roberts asserts, “is that it commands individuals to purchase 
insurance.”108   However, Roberts articulates a second, equally plausible interpretation: that the 
individual mandate does not compel individuals to buy insurance, but rather imposes a tax on 
those who fail to do so.109  The mandate establishes a condition, i.e., not owning health 
insurance, which triggers a tax, i.e., the shared responsibility payment.110  Roberts invokes the 
historically recognized judicial duty to save a law from unconstitutionality if one can find any 
fair means to do so. 111 
To invoke the taxing power, Roberts must determine if the shared responsibility payment 
constitutes a penalty or a tax.  Roberts provides three justifications for interpreting it as a tax, 
including: (1) the tax is far less than the price of insurance; (2) the mandate does not contain a 
scienter requirement; and (3) the payment is collected by the IRS through normal means of 
taxation.112  The mere fact that the mandate encourages individuals to engage in certain conduct 
does not render the tax a penalty, as a penalty entails some unlawful act or omission with ensuing 
negative legal consequences.113  Beyond requiring a payment to the IRS the mandate, the 
mandate did not impose negative legal consequences.114 
                                                 
107 See id.  
108 See id. at 2593. 
109 See id. at 2593-94. 
110 Id. at 2564. 
111 See Tribe, supra. at 63. 
112 Id. at 2595-96. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. at 2597. 
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Roberts’ theme surfaces once again.  Roberts’ emphasizes that Congress’ taxing power 
has its limits.115  Even if the mandate operated as a tax, it would lose its character as a tax if it 
became the functional equivalent of a penalty, i.e., a mechanism for regulation and 
punishment.116  Congress’ authority to tax is strictly limited to its power to direct payment and 
collect money.117 Since Congress obtained the power to tax a particular transaction, the 
legislature bears the burden to oversee and ensure its reasonableness.118 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito do not agree with Roberts’ interpretation of 
the individual mandate.  The justices accuse Roberts of overstepping his judicial role to interpret 
law and rewriting the mandate in order to save it from unconstitutionality.119 
Justice Ginsberg denounced the Chief Justice’s reasoning that the mandate could be 
saved by the taxing power even though the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
afforded the federal government sufficient authority to invoke and carry out the individual 
mandate.120  Ginsberg asserts that the mandate was regulatory in nature and that it could be 
upheld in that manner.121  In sharp contrast to Justice Roberts, Ginsberg asserts that the Framers 
of the Constitution intended that the Commerce Clause grant Congress the authority to enact 
economic legislation in the interests of the Union and in those cases where the separate states are 
incompetent to do so.122  To capably carry out such an enormous power, Congress must maintain 
                                                 
115 Id. at 2599. 
116 Id. at 2600. 
117 See id. (concluding that Commerce Clause grants Congress greater control over individual behavior than that 
granted by the taxing power, and under the Commerce Clause, Congress may command individuals to do as it 
directs and those who disobey may be subjected to criminal sanctions, which suggests that this power contains 
regulatory and punitive elements). 
118  See id.; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain , 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2012) 
(discussing cases). 
119 See id. at 2651, 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, Thomas J. dissenting). 
120 See id. at 2613, 2618-19 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (Justice Sotomayor joined). 
121 See id. at 2619. 
122 See id. at 2615-16 (“Alexander Hamilton emphasized, ‘than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged 
in the national government, from ... its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future 
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leeway to undertake and solve national problems directly and realistically.123  Justice Ginsberg 
pillories Roberts for the “inactivity” limitation.124  Ginsberg exclaims, “[g]iven these far-
reaching effects on interstate commerce, the decision to forgo insurance is hardly 
inconsequential or equivalent to ‘doing nothing.” 125  She prophesies that the sheer number of 
uninsured individuals who do not need insurance coverage today will likely need it tomorrow.126  
Therefore, the decision to forego insurance has substantial effects on the national economy and 
constitutes an economic decision the federal government has the authority to regulate.127 
ii. Boumediene v. Bush (2008) (Dissent) 
In 2008, the Roberts Court revisited the extent of power of the federal government and 
the delicate balance between the Executive and Legislatives branches in a different context.  
In 2001, the Bush Administration United States launched its War on Terror.128  In the 
wake of the War on Terror, the Administration enacted several laws that limited the rights of 
enemy personnel captured at home and abroad.129  In 2001, the Bush Administration enacted the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which authorized the President to “use all 
necessary and appropriate forces” against any nation, organization, or person that “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided” the attacks of 2001 to prevent future attacks against the United 
States.130 The AUMF authorized the detention of detainees or enemy personnel at the United 
States’ Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, over which the United States maintained an indefinite 
                                                                                                                                                             
contingencies[,] as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that 
capacity.’”). 
123 See id. at 2616. 
124 See id. at 2615. 
125 See id. at 2617. 
126 See id. at 2620. 
127 See id. at 2619-20, 2621. 
128 See Tribe, supra. at 186. 
129 See id. 
130 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001). 
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lease and de jure sovereignty.131  In 2002, the Executive Branch enacted the Military 
Commission No. 1, which provided in part that all cases concerning enemy personnel be heard 
by a military commission, that these commissions could consider hearsay evidence and any 
evidence obtained through enhanced interrogation techniques, and that detainees could not hear 
or learn about any evidence deemed classified prior to trial.132  Additionally, it limited a 
detainees’ ability to seek habeas corpus review.133  From 2004 onward, the Court tackled and 
declared unconstitutional many of the Bush Administration’s national security policies.134 
In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”), which 
prohibited any court, justice, or judge from considering an application for habeas corpus filed by 
or on behalf of an alien detained at Guantanamo and gave the D.C. Court of Appeals “exclusive” 
jurisdiction to review CSRT decisions.135  In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (“MCA”), which contained provisions similar to those enumerated in the Military 
Commission No. 1.136 
The Court considered the constitutionality of the DTA and MCA in Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).137  Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, holding that aliens 
                                                 
131 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding federal government’s power to detain aliens at 
Guantanamo Bay as a fundamental and necessary incident to war). 
132 See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 § 6(A)(3), 4(C). 
133 See id. 
134 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that Guantanamo Bay was not outside civilian court jurisdiction 
and that detainees must be afforded habeas corpus relief); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) 
(declaring Military Commission No. 1 unconstitutional because Constitution authorized Congress, not Executive 
Branch, to set up military commissions and to try enemy personnel detained in War on Terror). 
135 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005(e), 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (2006). 
136 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (2014); see also H.R. Rep. No. 109-664(II), 2006 
WL 2767036, Purpose and Summary (Sept. 25, 2006) (Commissions may hear and consider hearsay evidence or any 
evidence obtained through enhanced interrogation techniques and detainees could not attempt to refute or learn 
about evidence against them deemed classified. Moreover, the Act attempted to mandate that all outstanding habeas 
corpus submissions on behalf of the captives should be quashed); See Alissa J. Kness, The Military Commissions 
Act of 2006: An Unconstitutional Response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 52 S.D. L. Rev. 382, 383 (2007). 
137 See Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantánamo Bay Jefferson Lecture University of California, Berkeley 
September 17, 2008, 27 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, 17-18 (2009) (noting that the Court initially refused to hear 
Boumediene v. Bush, with Justice Souter, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer dissenting, however, last minute 
statements by army personnel on behalf of Boumediene swayed the Court to h ear the case). 
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detained as enemy combatants have the right to habeas corpus under the Constitution and any 
alternative procedures provided by Congress in the DTA and MCA were insufficient.138  Much 
of Kennedy’s argument is predicated on the notion that habeas corpus relief is a fundamental 
individual liberty and a right historically afforded to aliens.139  For the first half of Kennedy’s 
opinion he analyzes the birth and evolution of habeas corpus in painstaking detail, slowly 
moving from its origination in England’s Magna Carta to its use during World War II.140  
Kennedy draws numerous analogies between England and its foreign territories under de facto 
English control, such as Ireland, wherein habeas corpus was afforded to non-citizens.141 
Kennedy states that the Constitution and its drafters believed that freedom from unlawful 
restraint constituted a fundamental principle of liberty and the writ of habeas corpus constituted 
the means to secure that freedom.142  Kennedy asserts that the Suspension Clause protects an 
individual’s habeas corpus rights by providing that habeas corpus may be suspended only in 
cases of a threat to public safety, such as in cases of rebellion or invasion.143  Following 
precedent set forth in Johnson v. Eisentrager, Kennedy concludes the Suspension Clause applies 
in the present case because the petitioners are aliens arrested outside the United States, the 
United States maintains complete control and jurisdiction over the detention, and the financial 
and administrative costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military 
detention abroad as not so great as to limit the reach of the Clause.  144 Therefore, Kennedy 
determines that there was no justification to suspend the writ.145 
                                                 
138 See Tribe, supra. at 197. 
139 See id. 
140 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740-41 (2008) (Kennedy, J.). 
141 See id. at 750-51. 
142 See Tribe, supra. at 197-98. 
143 See Boumediene, 553 at 745-46, 756. 
144 See id. at 766-67 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950)) (Kennedy articulates a three-part test 
to ascertain the reach of the Suspension Clause in United States territories, including:  (a) is the detainee an enemy 
alien; (b) has the detainee never been or resided in the United States; (c) was the detainee captured outside of United 
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Next, Kennedy distinguishes the habeas corpus restrictions of the MCA and DTA from 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which the Court 
declared constitutional.146  In contrast to the prisoners targeted by the AEDPA, the detainees did 
not receive a fair trial in open court nor did they have the opportunity to directly appeal their 
convictions.147  Furthermore, Kennedy compares the MCA and DTA to judicially recognized 
“habeas substitutes”.148  These “habeas substitutes”, Kennedy determines, provided alternative 
or substitute review procedures that streamlined the review process rather than eliminating it all 
together.149  In Kennedy’s view, the MCA and DTA totally suspend the habeas corpus right and 
circumscribe the proper channels for habeas review in federal court.150   
Lastly, Kennedy rejects the government’s argument that the United States lacked 
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay and therefore the petitioners could not assert their habeas 
corpus rights.151  Kennedy finds that the United States clearly exercised de facto control over 
Guantanamo Bay for more than a hundred years and as such, constitutional protections of habeas 
corpus relief ran from the United States to its Naval Base.152  Additionally, because the writ of 
habeas corpus extended to the Naval Base, the detainees were not required to exhaust their 
procedures of judicial review prior to invoking the right.153 
                                                                                                                                                             
States territory and held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was the detainee tried and convicted by a 
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) was the detainee tried for offenses against laws of war 
committed outside the United States; (f) and is the detainee at all times imprisoned outside the United States).  
145 See id. 
146 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1997) (upholding AEDPA’s provisions limiting ability of persons to  file 
successive writs of habeas corpus because it did not unconstitutionally suspend the writ in violation of the 
Suspension Clause). 
147 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 777-78. 
148 See id. at 785 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)). 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 777-78. 
151 See id. at 753. 
152 See id. at 753, 756. 
153 See id. at 794-95. 
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From the outset of his dissent, Roberts criticizes the majority for intervening in affairs 
left solely for the federal government without any legally cognizable power to intervene.154  
Roberts asserts that Congress set up a system that provided some of the most “extensive legal 
and procedural protections” afforded enemy combatants in the history of the United States.155 
Roberts surmises that “[o]ne cannot help but think after surveying the modest practical results of 
the majority’s ambitious opinion that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but 
about control of federal policy regarding enemy combatants.”156 
Accordingly, Roberts addresses a threshold matter apart from the writ’s scope.157  
Roberts asserts that “[t]he critical threshold question in these cases”, prior to any inquiry about 
the writ’s scope, “is whether the system the political branches designed protects whatever rights 
the detainees may possess”.158  If the system protects detainee rights, then there is no need for 
any additional process, such as habeas relief.159  Roberts calls the majority reasoning 
“misguided” and “fruitless” because it does not analyze the process of the DTA or its satisfaction 
of detainee rights, but simply shifts the responsibility of overseeing foreign policy and national 
security concerns from the federal government to the judiciary.  160 
Roberts details the judicial review process that Congress envisioned when it enacted the 
DTA.  The detainee appears before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) followed by 
review in the D.C. Circuit.  Congress authorized the D.C. Circuit to decide whether the CSRT 
proceedings were consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.161  Roberts 
                                                 
154 See id. at 801 (Roberts, J. dissenting) (Roberts joins Justice Scalia’s opinion analyzing judicial precedent and 
history of habeas corpus). 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 802. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. at 803. 
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contends that because the Supreme Court granted certiorari before the D.C. Circuit could render 
its review, the Court cannot determine if Circuit review vindicates the petitioner’s rights and if 
the petitioner-detainees are entitled to habeas relief.162   The effect of the majority’s decision, 
Roberts forewarns, is to impose an additional, time-consuming judicial review process that may 
not prove to be any more effective than the statutorily defined process under the DTA.163 
Roberts found support for his argument in the Court’s previous decision in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.164  The Court in Hamdi, Roberts argues, concluded that a military tribunal could 
adequately and properly vindicate a citizen enemy combatant’s due process rights, and if 
necessary, a citizen enemy combatant could seek review in an Article III court.165 Roberts’ 
suggests that if Hamdi found that a military tribunal satisfied the due process rights of a citizen, 
then non-citizens should receive no greater rights.166  The DTA represented Congress’ attempt to 
provide accused alien combatants constitutionally adequate opportunities to contest their 
detentions before a military tribunal, i.e., CSRT, and seek review in an Article III court, i.e., D.C. 
Circuit.167  In accordance with judicial precedent, Roberts concludes that DTA’s two-tier level of 
review, with the combined efforts of the CSRT and D.C. Circuit, sufficiently protects the alien 
enemy combatant’s due process rights.168 
Roberts then analyzes every statutory right afforded to petitioners at the CSRT stage.  
Roberts cites to the Government’s Implementation Memorandum and determines that every 
petitioner possesses the right to present evidence that he was wrongfully detained, including to 
                                                 
162 See id. at 803, 804. 
163 See id. at 807-808. 
164 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 504 (2004) (guaranteeing an American citizen challenging his detention as an 
enemy combatant the right to notice of the evidence before him and a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence before a 
neutral decisionmaker). 
165 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 538. 
166 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added). 
167 See id. at 810. 
168 See id. 
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call all reasonably available witnesses, to question hostile witnesses, to introduce documentary 
evidence, and to testify before the tribunal.169  Roberts’ rejects the majority’s disapproval of the 
admission of hearsay stating that Hamdi expressly approved the use of hearsay by habeas 
courts.170  Additionally, Roberts notes that each petitioner is provided a personal representative, 
who reviews classified documents and challenges this evidence at the CSRT on the petitioner’s 
behalf.171  “Keep in mind”, Roberts reassures, “that all this is just at the CSRT stage”.172 
 Roberts flatly rejects the majority’s argument that because the DTA prohibits a petitioner 
from presenting new or additional evidence after the CSRT stage, but before the D.C. Circuit 
stage, the DTA does not constitute a sufficient replacement for habeas review.173  Roberts 
criticizes the majority for declaring unconstitutional an act of Congress based upon some 
hypothetical case wherein a detainee loses out on the benefits of newly discovered evidence.174  
Roberts fully acknowledges that the DTA does not envision the introduction of newly discovered 
evidence before the D.C. Circuit, but the DTA permits the D.C. Circuit to remand a case for a 
new CSRT determination.175  Roberts assumes that if newly discovered evidence appeared, the 
D.C. Circuit would remand for additional findings.176   More importantly, Roberts affirms that 
judicial precedent dictates that the Court’s decision to declare an act unconstitutional cannot be 
solely predicated on hypothetical cases.177 
                                                 
169 See id. at 816-17. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. 816-17 (noting that Geneva Convention, like the DTA, does not allow prisoners of war or detainees to 
gain or ever gain access to classified files). 
172 See id. at 818 (discussing additional safeguards in D.C. Circuit). 
173 See id. at 818-19. 
174 See id. at 820. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
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In conclusion, Roberts suggests that Congress fell victim to a “bait and switch”.178  
Roberts contends that Hamdi’s rationale was directly applicable to this case, but the majority 
afforded it scant review.179  Congress, the President, and the Nation’s military leaders made a 
good faith effort to comply with the Court’s precedent, but the majority refused to take “yes” as 
answer.180  Roberts criticizes the majority for misconstruing the structure of the DTA when its 
structure looks very similar to the structure blessed by the Hamdi Court.181  Similarly, Roberts 
derides the majority for declaring unconstitutional the DTA without recommending or proposing 
alternatives of its own and disregarding evidence that the DTA will look substantially similar to 
habeas relief.182  Lastly, Roberts criticizes the majority for displacing Congress’ policy choices 
with the majority’s own.183  The role of the judiciary, Roberts contends, was to determine if the 
DTA and MCA procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause; 
it was not to displace congressional choices of policy with the judiciary’s own.184 
b. First Amendment – Freedom Of Speech 
i. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
In 2010, the Supreme Court tackled the First Amendment rights of corporations to 
advocate or oppose the election or defeat of political candidates.  The Court afforded 
corporations and unions the right to spend as much money as they choose so long as these 
                                                 
178 See id. at 811. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. at 812, 822 (criticizing majority because it refuses to concede that Congress did something right; that in 
spite of earlier failed attempts, Congress intended to enact an adequate substitute for habeas relief). 
181 See id. at 812, 823 (criticizing the majority’s persistent misreading of the statute and arguing that the statute, like 
general habeas review law, clearly grants the CSRT, D.C. Circuit, and Administrative Review boards the authority 
to order the release of a detainee and therefore fashion a remedy and that this statutorily defined remedy constitutes 
a sufficient substitute for habeas relief). 
182 See id. 
183 See id. at 822. 
184 See id. at 825. 
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entities do not coordinate their political advertising with a candidate’s campaign.185  Many 
commenters criticize Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission for irreparably harming 
the nation’s political process by allowing corporate funds to covertly coordinate “independent” 
election activities.186  However, the Roberts Court was in a tough position as its current judicial 
precedent on a corporation’s First Amendment rights was contradictory and did not articulate a 
clear rule as to what campaign activities a corporation could lawfully influence. 
The case arose from efforts by Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation that accepted 
contributions from for-profit corporations, to promote and distribute a documentary aptly named 
Hillary: The Movie that attacked Hillary Clinton during her efforts to obtain the Democratic 
president nomination.  Citizens United sought to distribute and promote Hillary: The Movie 
through video-on-demand and television.  Federal law prohibited any “electioneering 
communications” funded by corporations from taking place thirty days before a primary 
election.187  Citizens United challenged limitations imposed by Section 203 of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) on independent expenditures made by corporations 
within thirty days of a primary election.188  During the first round of oral arguments, Citizens 
United argued that Hillary: The Movie did not constitute an electioneering communication that 
urged voters to defeat Clinton’s nomination.189  Rather, it took a broader critical view of Hillary 
Clinton’s political ideologies and actions.190  However, several of the more conservative justices, 
including Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas sought to decide the broader constitutional issue 
                                                 
185 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n , 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
186 See Tribe, supra. at 89. 
187 See 2 U.S.C. §441(b). 
188 See Tribe, supra. at 91. 
189 See id. at 92. 
190 See id.  
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from the very beginning.191 Ultimately, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) and argued that current limitations imposed by 
Section 203 on corporate independent expenditures resulted in an unreasonable chilling effect on 
First Amendment free speech rights.192 
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court.193  Justice Kennedy’s opinion praised the 
values of unfettered free speech and criticized government censorship, even if well-
intentioned.194  Extolling the core principles of First Amendment liberty, Justice Kennedy did not 
fully decide Citizens United on narrow grounds.195  Kennedy moved beyond a narrow holding 
that the movie was not publically distributed nor the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
into the limitations of the First Amendment.196  In order to address the constitutional limitations 
of the First Amendment, Kennedy reconsidered the entire facial validity of Section 203 and its 
effects on political speech.197  Kennedy reasoned that because these types of cases invoke serious 
implications for statutory and constitutional interpretation the Court should address and correct 
any inconsistencies in his past jurisprudence.198 
Kennedy asserted that the Court has consistently recognized that First Amendment 
protections extend to associations of persons, individuals, and corporations and any limitations 
                                                 
191 See id.; see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Oath, 165-69 (New York:  Random House, 2012) (noting that the Court the 
parties back to reargue the constitutional issues after it decided that Hillary: The Movie did not constitute an 
electioneering communication). 
192 See id. 
193 Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion except for Part VI. 
194 See Tribe, supra. at 93 
195 See id. 
196 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 892 (holding that Court could not resolve Citizens United on an as applied basis, 
solely analyzing the facts of the case before it, as this would chill political speech. Therefore, the Court broade ned 
the case from Citizen’s United initial narrower arguments, focusing only on Hillary, to reconsider both the validity 
of its prior jurisprudence and the facial validity of § 441b). 
197 See id. at 892-94 (applying strict scrutiny and requiring government to demonstrate that statute served a 
compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to meet that interest). 
198 See id. at 894-95. 
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cannot be premised on the entity’s corporate identity.199  Kennedy rectified the holding in Austin 
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce with more corporation-friendly jurisprudence.200  In 
addressing limitations of the First Amendment on corporations, Kennedy determined the pre-
Austin line of reasoning that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity is the correct reasoning.201  The majority held that prohibitions on corporate 
speech imposed by Section 441(b) constitutes an outright ban on free speech and since the 
government could not articulate a narrowly tailored and compelling interest that supports such 
ban, Section 441(b)’s ban is unconstitutional.202  Kennedy rejects the government’s argument 
that it sought to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.203  Additionally, Kennedy 
rejects the government’s argument that it sought to protect corporate shareholder rights.204 
Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion that addressed the importance of adhering to 
stare decisis and the importance of abandoning precedent that is no longer viable.205  Roberts 
asserts that the First Amendment protects “more than just the individual on a soapbox and the 
                                                 
199 See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 714 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional 
Massachusetts campaign finance law that prohibited corporate donations in ballot initiatives unless the corporation’s 
interests were directly involved and allowing corporations to exercise their First Amendment rights through 
contributions); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (invalidating 
federal expenditure ban, which applied to individuals, corporations, and unions, because it failed to serve any 
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corrup tion in the electoral process , but 
upholding public financing scheme, disclosure rules, and limits on direct contributions to campaigns ). 
200 Id. at 888-89, 912-13 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 492 U.S. 652 (1990), which upheld a 
requirement that corporations use a political action committee rather than the corporation’s general treasury funds to 
support or oppose candidates for office in the state of Michigan). 
201 Id. at 903-904. 
202 Id. at 897, 913. 
203 See id. at 909-10 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 
136-138 (2003) (rejecting “anti-corruption” argument and holding that: (1) independent expenditures “do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption”; (2) government interest of preventing corruption was  limited to 
quid pro quo corruption; (3) this interest justifies restrictions on direct contributions to candidates, not on 
independent expenditures; and (4) any influence of independent expenditures in the electoral or campa ign process 
will not result in loss of confidence in political process). 
204 See id. at 911 (rejecting “shareholder protection” argument and holding that: Under a shareholder protection 
interest, if shareholders of a media corporation disagreed with its political views, the government would have the 
authority to restrict the media corporation’s political speech, i.e., running editorials, and such a ban is over-inclusive 
because it includes corporations comprised of a single shareholder). 
205 See id. at 917 (Roberts, J.) (Justice Alito joined). 
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lonely pamphleteer”.206  Roberts acknowledges that it is the Court’s obligation to refrain from 
addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to decide issues before it.207  
Nevertheless, Roberts contends that the constitutional issue – whether Section 441(b) may be 
enforced, consistent with the First Amendment, against corporations – was indispensably 
necessary to resolving Citizens United.208 
According to Roberts, “[t]here is a difference between judicial restraint and judicial 
abdication”.209  Roberts disagrees with the dissent’s reaffirmation of Austin decision and 
contends that the cases succeeding Austin did not specifically ask the Court to reconsider 
Austin’s holding.210  Roberts criticizes the dissent for overlooking the negative consequences of 
Austin on the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and recognizes that while stare decisis is 
important, it is a “principle of policy” subject to change in a principled and intelligible way.211  
Roberts agrees with the majority opinion that Austin constituted an “aberration” that departed 
significantly from corporation-friendly First Amendment jurisprudence, which specifically 
declared unconstitutional restrictions on speech that enhanced the voice of others or equalized 
the ability of individuals or groups to influence the outcome of elections.212  Roberts contends 
that the slight factual distinctions between Citizens United and previous cases do not sanction 
prohibitions on a corporation’s rights under the First Amendment.213 
                                                 
206 See id. 
207 See id. at 918. 
208 See id. at 919. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 920. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. at 921 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49). 
213 See id. (noting that Bellotti involved a referendum rather than a candidate election). 
Katerina Mantell 
Professor Wefing – U.S. Supreme Court 
 28 
Roberts interprets Austin’s rationale to authorize the prohibition of political speech by a 
category of speakers solely to effectuate equality among speakers.214  Roberts criticizes the 
dissent for succumbing to the “temptation” of equalizing speech and to prevent an individual or 
group from more effectively supporting or opposing a candidate.215  Roberts reiterates that to 
rely on Austin when its reasoning spawns future mistakes would fundamentally undercut rule of 
law principles that stare decisis seeks to protect and inhibits the Court’s jurisprudence from 
developing in a principled and intelligible way.216  
ii. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett , 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011) 
In 1998, Arizona reformed traditional public financing programs in response to several 
corruption scandals involving its governor, several legislators, and two United States senators.217  
The Clean Citizens Elections Act provided public money to candidates who agreed to limit their 
personal or private spending to $500, participate in at least one debate and return unspent 
money.218  The matching funds provision of the Clean Citizens Elections Act provided that 
candidates received initial public grants and then additional public funding based on amounts 
spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups supporting them.219  The dual 
purpose of the Act was to ensure that candidates relying predominantly on public funding were 
not outspent by wealthy opponents and their supporters as well as to encourage candidates to 
                                                 
214 See id. at 922-23, 924 (rejecting government’s argument that Austin’s compelling interest was the prevention of 
actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption and protection of corporate shareholders rights, rather than diminishment 
of the corrosive and distorting effects of aggregations of wealth accumulated with assistance by corporations). 
215 See id. at 923. 
216 See id. at 924. 
217 See Tribe, supra. at 116; see also Citizens Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-940 et seq. (1998). 
218 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-941(A)(2), § 16-956(A)(2), § 16-953. 
219 See §§ 16-952(A)-(C). 
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utilize and recognize the benefits of Arizona’s public funding system.220  Arizona followed in the 
footsteps of several other states that implemented similar laws.221 
Past and future Arizona candidates and two independent expenditure groups, the 
conservative Goldwater Institute and the libertarian Institute for Justice, challenged the 
constitutionality of the matching funds provision, arguing that it penalized their speech and 
burdened their ability to exercise their rights under the First Amendment.222  The District Court 
entered a permanent injunction against Arizona’s enforcement of the matching funds 
provision.223  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the provision imposed minimal burden on 
First Amendment rights and that it was justified by the State’s interest to reduce quid pro quo 
political corruption.224 
Roberts wrote the majority opinion.225  Roberts predominantly relies precedent set forth 
in Davis v. Federal Election Commission.226  Davis stands for the proposition that a state or the 
federal government cannot enact campaign finance laws so restrictive that it unconstitutionally 
coerces a candidate or its supporters to choose between the right to engage in “unfettered free 
speech” or succumb to discriminatory fundraising limitations implemented solely to level the 
playing field.227  Roberts states that Davis’s logic controls in the instant case as the matching 
funds provision “imposes an unprecedented penalty” on a wealthy candidate’s ability to exercise 
                                                 
220 See Tribe, supra. at 116. 
221 See Adam Liptak, Justices Strike Down Arizona Campaign Finance Law , NYTimes.com, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/politics/28campaign.html?_r=0, Jun. 27, 2011 (noting that Connecticut, 
Florida, Maine, Minnesota and North Carolina adopted public financing systems similar to Arizona’s, but courts 
blocked the enforcement of these laws). 
222 See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett , 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2816 (2011). 
223 See id. (Roberts, J.) 
224 See id. 
225 Justices Alito, Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia joined. 
226 See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) (declaring unconstitutional the “Millionaire’s 
Amendment” of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a), which provided that if a 
candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives spent more than $35,000 of personal funds, the opponent of this 
candidate could collect individual contributions up to $9,600 per contributor, or three times the normal contribution 
limit of $2,300). 
227 See Bennett, 131 S.Ct. at 2818. 
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his or her free speech rights and permits his or her adversary to take advantage of the leveled 
playing field.228  Moreover, Roberts asserts that Bennett poses even greater constitutional 
implications than Davis as the matching funds provision initiates the direct and automatic release 
of public money for the benefit of the public candidate at the expense of the privately funded 
candidate, who may forego his or her personal spending as well as any spending provided by an 
independent expenditure groups to avoid the matching funds automatic disbursal of funds.229  
Roberts finds that independent expenditure groups suffer substantially from the matching 
funds provision because these groups lack a political connection to the electoral process and rely 
solely on the infiltration of monies to support or oppose a candidate.230  Roberts determines these 
independent expenditure groups face a harsh choice, i.e., trigger the matching funds provision, 
change the content of their speech, or withdraw entirely.231  Roberts states that the record 
contains numerous examples of candidates curtailing fundraising efforts and discouraging 
independent expenditure group donations.232  Roberts asserts that it is illogical to coerce a 
candidate to hover just below the matching funds threshold by rejecting independent expenditure 
funding or be subject to the discriminatory application of this threshold.233 
Roberts then focuses his analysis on statutory structure and legislative intent to determine 
if the matching funds provision furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.234  Roberts does not find Arizona’s justifications to be compelling.235  Roberts 
                                                 
228 Id. (acknowledging that there is slight differences between the Millionaire’s Amendment analyzing in Davis and 
the matching funds provision because the matching funds provision did not impose an outright cap). 
229 Id. at 2819. 
230 Id. at 2819-20. 
231 Id. at 2820 (rejecting Arizona’s separate argument that Davis was distinguishable). 
232 Id. at 2822. 
233 See id. at 2823. 
234 In accordance with this standard, the Court has consistently invalidated restrictions on campaign expenditures, 
restraints on independent expenditures applied to express advocacy groups, limits on uncoordinated political party 
expenditures, and prohibitions against unions, nonprofit associations, and corporations from making independent 
expenditures for electioneering communication. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-54 (1976); Federal 
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rejects Arizona’s argument that the state has an interest in promoting free and open debate in 
state elections because Arizona increases speech for one group while impermissibly burdening 
the speech of another.236  To further this point, Roberts discredits the dissent’s claim that judicial 
precedent has never found pubic funding or government subsidies for one group to constitute a 
First Amendment burden on another group.237  Roberts asserts that none of the cases the dissent 
cites “involved a subsidy given in direct response to the political speech of another, to allow the 
recipient to counter that speech.”238  In fact, the “direct response” is distinguishable from 
disclosure or disclaimer requirements as these types of provisions do not result in a direct 
windfall to the opposing party.239  Roberts concludes that it is the incremental distribution of 
public funds in direct response to private funding that impermissibly burdens speech.240  The 
state’s desire to the level the playing field is not compelling enough to warrant such an intrusion 
on First Amendment rights, especially when Arizona enacted austere contribution limits and 
stringent fundraising disclosure requirements to deter potential corruption.241 
Justice Kagan penned a forceful dissent, exclaiming that “[e]xcept in a world gone topsy-
turvy, additional campaign speech and electoral competition is not a First Amendment injury.”242  
Kagan asserts that the petitioners’ claims are illogical because Arizona offered support to any 
                                                                                                                                                             
Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-65 (1986); Colorado Republican 
Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996); Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
235 See id. at 2820. 
236 See id. at 2821. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. at 2822 n. 9 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91-95, 96). 
239 See id. at 2822. 
240 See id. at 2824, 2833 (Roberts acknowledged that if Arizona provided a lump-sum distribution without any 
reference to concurrent private funding, such lump-sum provisions would not impermissibly burden speech.  Unlike 
the dissent, Roberts does not believe that the direct response model are substantially similar to the lump -sum model 
and does not believe that the direct response model provides an improved method of distributing public funds).  
241 See id. at 2825-26, 2827. 
242 See id. at 2833 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
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person running for state office, but the petitioners refused that assistance.243 It is illogical to 
claim that Arizona violated the petitioner’s First Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other 
speakers when the petitioners could have received, but spurned, the state’s financial 
assistance.244  Kagan asserts that “[s]ome people might call that chutzpah”.245  Kagan concludes 
that Arizona’s matching funds provision subsidizes rather than restricts free speech to guarantee 
robust campaigns that elect representatives not beholden to the few, but accountable to 
everyone.246 
c. Fourth Amendment – Warrantless Search and Seizure 
i. Georgia v. Randolph (2006) (Dissent) 
In 2006, the Roberts Court tackled the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against warrantless searches.  Georgia v. Randolph was Roberts’ first dissent since ascending to 
his role as Chief Justice. 247  On July 6, 2001, Respondent Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, got 
into a domestic dispute, which prompted Janet to call the police.248  When the police came to the 
Randolph residence, Janet informed the police that her husband removed their child to their 
neighbor’s home.249  She also informed the police that her husband was a habitual cocaine-
user.250  The police went with Janet to retrieve the boy and upon returning to the Randolph 
residence she reiterated to the police claims of Scott’s drug abuse and volunteered that there was 
drug evidence in the home.251  Janet consented to a police search.252  Scott refused to consent to a 
                                                 
243 See id. at 2835. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. at 2829, 2833. 
247 See Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Dissent Reveals Strain Beneath Court’s Placid Surface , NY Times (Mar. 23, 
2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/politics/23scotus .html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (the Court issued its 
opinion in Georgia v. Randolph approximately five months after Roberts ascended to the role of Chief Justice). 
248 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). 
249 See id. 
250 See id. 
251 See id. 
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police search.253  Upon Janet’s consent, the police entered the house and found evidence of 
drugs.254  At some point during the search Janet revoked her consent.255  Respondent was 
indicted for possession of cocaine and the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence 
as products of a warrantless search unauthorized by consent.256 
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.  The issue to be decided was as follows: 
whether an evidentiary seizure is lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other, 
who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to 
consent.257  The Court’s existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence held that a warrantless entry 
and search of one’s premises is valid when police obtains voluntary consent of an occupant who 
shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant 
criminal defendant.258  In this case, the Court held, that because Scott was physically present on 
the premises and refused to consent to police entry, the police’s entry and search of the Randolph 
residence constituted an unreasonable and invalid warrantless search.259 
 Souter determined that the facts in United States v. Matlock  were reasonably analogous to 
Randolph and as such, Matlock’s rule of law that co-habitation entails some form of common 
understanding that one co-occupant can affect the other co-occupant’s interests is applicable.260  
Nevertheless, Souter noted that this case was a matter of first impression for the Court as none of 
                                                                                                                                                             
252 See id. 
253 See id. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
256 See id. at 107-108. 
257 See id. at 106. 
258 See id. at 106, 109 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 
(1974)). 
259 See id. at 106. 
260 See id. at 109-110 (suggesting that if the police approach a dwelling and a woman with a baby on her hip permits 
police entry and search, the validity of the search is premised on the reasonable belief that the woman resided as a 
co-tenant in the dwelling and possessed the authority as a co-tenant to consent). 
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the Court’s “co-occupant consent-to-search” cases contained the additional fact of a second 
occupant being physically present and refusing permission to search.261 
 Justice Souter supports his decision to distinguish Randolph from preceding cases with 
what he considers to be a “shared social expectation”.262  Specifically, in the context of social 
guests who temporarily inhabit a dwelling, Court precedent holds that these guests are entitled to 
some degree of privacy and a co-occupant cannot consent to entry and search over the objection 
of the guest.263 Souter argues that no reasonable person would enter and search a dwelling if a 
co-occupant stood in the doorway saying, “stay out”.264  While Souter acknowledges the 
consenting occupant’s interest in revealing criminal activity as well as his or her interest in 
deflecting or dispelling any suspicion raised by sharing the dwelling with a criminal, a co-
occupant must obtain these benefits without the advantage of a rule of law that ignores his or her 
co-occupant’s refusal.265 Souter asserted that the threshold element of “physical presence” 
offered a justified and pragmatic formula, a bright-line in which to judge warrantless searches.266 
The Chief Justice criticizes the majority opinion for creating a new precedent in the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based upon “randomness” and “happenstance”, 
overlooking the grim realities that will likely result from such a peculiar, yet judicially invoked 
protection.267  Roberts first explains the current judicial precedent clearly stands for the 
                                                 
261 Compare Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109, with Matlock , 415 U.S. at 166 (Respondent Matlock was arrested for 
robbery and sought to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his premises, which he rented from the Graff 
family.  The Graff family rented the home to several other individuals, including Matlock and Ms. Graff.  When the 
police approached the dwelling, Ms. Graff allegedly consented to their entrance.  Matlock  followed judicial 
precedent, which held that the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as 
against the absent, non-consenting person with whom that authority is shared) (emphasis added). 
262 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
263 See id. at 113 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990)). 
264 See id. at 113. 
265 See id. at 115-16. 
266 See id. at 122. 
267 See id. at 127 (Roberts, J. dissenting). 
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proposition that a warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a 
person authorized to give it, including co-occupants.268 
Roberts cautions that the practical effects of the majority’s limitation pins the consenter 
against the objector.269  The majority’s limitation necessarily places the consenter, the objector, 
and the police in the predicament of determining who holds more authority to consent to or 
refuse entry and search.270  To demonstrate the peculiarity of the majority’s opinion, Roberts 
postulates a number of hypothetical situations in which a guest may feel disinclined to turn away 
from a room or dwelling even if a co-occupant objects.271  Roberts explains that an invited guest, 
i.e., the police, who encounters two disagreeing co-occupants would not turn away based upon 
what the majority considers a social expectation.272  Roberts stresses that long settled judicial 
precedent recognizes that while “[o]ur common social expectations” assume that one will not 
share with another what we have shared with them, “…that is the risk we take in sharing.”273 
One of Roberts’ hypotheticals depicts a domestic violence case.  Robert forewarns that 
there will be many cases in which a consenting co-occupant’s wish to have the police enter is 
overridden by an objection from another present co-occupant.274  As a result of the co-occupant’s 
refusal, the police will turn away and the consenting co-occupant will likely be subject to the 
same or worse abuse for calling and acquiescing to a police search.  275 
In accordance with his judicial philosophy, Roberts continuously reiterates long-settled 
judicial precedent throughout his dissenting opinion.  Roberts argues that the majority’s efforts to 
                                                 
268 See id.  
269 See id. at 129. 
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 See id. at 130. 
273 See id. at 131, 133 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 443 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) for proposition that “shared social expectations” is not 
a widely used as a means of demonstrating “reasonableness” in existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  
274 See id. at 136-37. 
275 See id. at 138. 
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distinguish Matlock and Rodriguez based on factual inconsistencies are misplaced.276  
Specifically, if the criminal defendants in Matlock and Rodriguez had been present to object, one 
can reasonably assume that they would have done so.277  The co-occupants in Matlock and 
Rodriguez possessed authority to admit the police into areas over which they exercised control, 
despite the presumed wishes of their present co-occupants.278 “The common thread in our 
decisions upholding searches conducted pursuant to third-party consent”, Roberts explains, “is 
an understanding that a person ‘assume[s] the risk’ that those who have access to and control 
over his shared property might consent to a search”.279 
d. Eighth Amendment – Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
i. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)  
In 2008, in Baze v. Rees, the court considered Kentucky’s capital punishment regime for 
certain criminal offenses.280  Kentucky provided for legal injection as a humane method of 
execution.281  The petitioners, convicted of double homicide, did not dispute that the lethal 
injection protocol, if applied as intended, would result in a humane death.282  Rather, the 
petitioners argued if improperly applied, the execution could result in significant pain, 
constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.283 
Roberts delivered the opinion of the court.  Roberts discusses, albeit briefly, the evolution 
of capital punishment and preferred methods of execution, including hanging, electrocution, and 
                                                 
276 See id. at 133-34 (citing Matlock , 415 U.S. at 166; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179). 
277 See id. at 
278 Id. at 134. 
279 See id. at 134. 
280 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 40 (2008) (Roberts, J.). 
281 See id.; see also Execution of Death Sentence, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.220(1)(a). 
282 See id.. 
283 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 41, 62. 
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lethal injection.284  Roberts calculates that 36 states and the federal government have adopted 
lethal injection as the exclusive or primary means of implementing the death penalty and 30 of 
those states used Kentucky’s combination of drugs in their lethal injection protocols.285  Roberts 
opines that while the Court “[h]as never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a 
sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment”, states have voluntarily 
restructured their methods to ensure humane execution of its prisoners.286   
Judicial precedent dictates that subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm, i.e., if the 
lethal injection procedures are improperly applied, can qualify as cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.287  Roberts explains that in order to violate the Eighth 
Amendment the procedures must be “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering,” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers”, as well as pose “substantial risk of 
serious harm,” or an “objectively intolerable risk of harm”.288  Additionally, Roberts relies on 
existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that holds, “[s]imply because an execution method 
may result in pain…does not establish the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that 
qualifies as cruel and unusual”.289  Roberts concludes that the slight risk of pain depicted by the 
                                                 
284 See Baze, supra. at 44 (noting that Kentucky, for example, used electrocution as the humane form of execution 
until 1998.  Kentucky provided that prisoners convicted before 1998 could opt for electrocution, but the prisoners 
must do so 20 days before their scheduled executions.  By 2008, the statute dictated that lethal injection was the 
default method of execution). 
285 See id. at 43-44 n. 1 (citing cases); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. (providing for lethal injection by federal 
government). 
286 See id. at 48 (citing to cases where the Court upheld execution by firing squad and electrocution as humane forms 
of execution). 
287 The petitioners argued that there was significant risk that the procedures for administering the sodium thiopental, 
or the barbiturate general anesthetic, would not be followed and therefore the drug would not have its intended 
effect. Id. at 49. 
288 Id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34–35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 
(1994)). 
289 See id. at 50 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), where mechanical malfunction 
in electrocution chair constituted an “accident” and cruel and unusual punishment). 
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petitioners did not warrant a finding that Kentucky’s lethal injection procedures violated the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.290 
Moreover, Roberts dismisses the petitioners’ claims that a slightly modified, safer 
alternative exists and because of these proposed alternatives the current lethal injection protocol 
violates the Eighth Amendment.291  The proffered alternative method must address the 
“substantial risk of harm” and to do so it must be feasible, readily implemented, and significantly 
reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.292  Roberts has no intention of transforming the courts 
into “boards of inquiry” responsible for determining “best practices” of executions.293 
Roberts meticulously analyzes the extensive protocol for administering the lethal 
injection explicitly outlined in Kentucky’s execution on death sentence statute.294  Given 
Kentucky’s extensive lethal injection protocol, including redundant measures for ensuring the 
administration of sufficient dosage of lethal drugs and constant medical oversight to correct any 
deficiencies, Roberts concluded that any risks identified by petitioners were not so substantial or 
imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.295 
Roberts recognizes that “[r]easonable people of good faith disagree on the morality and 
efficacy of capital punishment”, however, “for many who oppose it no method of execution 
would ever be acceptable”.296  Despite opposition to capital punishment, the Court has 
                                                 
290 See id. 
291 See id. at 51, 57-58. 
292 See id. at 52. 
293 See id. at 51 (forewarning that transforming courts into “boards of inquiry” will result  in increased litigation with 
petitioners looking to protract execution process with new technology that purports to improve procedures). 
294 See id. at 45-46 (examining statutorily mandated safeguards, including: (1) administration of precise quantity of 
drugs; (2) presence of certified medical personnel to perform the venipuncture procedures; (3) additional medical 
personnel to mix the precise quantity of drugs; (4) the construction of execution facilities with a control room, 
monitored by the warden and deputy warden separated from the witness room; and (5) the presence of a physician to 
revive the prisoner if a stay of execution should be granted). 
295 Id. at 55-56 (noting that Kentucky executed one prisoner pursuant to this protocol without any issues). 
296 See id. at 61. 
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consistently held that the Constitution does not prohibit capital punishment.297  Furthermore, 
Roberts reiterates the Court has never set a precedent for declaring any state method of execution 
cruel or unusual. 298  Roberts has no intention of setting such a precedent.  
ii. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) 
Jamer Graham was 16 years old when he committed armed burglary in Jacksonville, 
Florida.299  Graham entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution. 300  The Florida trial 
court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld adjudication of guilt.301  Shortly thereafter, 
Graham was arrested for a home invasion robbery, a crime of which he denied involvement.  302  
As a result, the trial court adjudicated Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his 
probation, and sentenced him to life in prison for the burglary.  303  However, because Florida 
abolished its parole system, the life sentence left Graham no possibility of parole.304  Graham 
challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.305  The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction.306 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed the principal issue:  whether the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permits a juvenile offender to be 
sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicide crime.307  Kennedy explains that the 
Eighth Amendment specifically bars the imposition of excessive fines or bail or the use of cruel 
                                                 
297 See id. 
298 See id. at 62. 
299 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010). 
300 See id. at 54. 
301 See id. 
302 See id. 
303 See id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Limit Life Sentences for Juveniles, NYTimes.com 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/politics/18court.html?_r=0, May 17, 2010. 
304 See id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003). 
305 See id. 
306 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 58. 
307 See id. at 52-53 (Kennedy, J.). 
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and unusual or barbaric punishments.308  Judicial precedent dictates that a determination of 
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual is predicated on evolving standards of decency of 
society; this standard embodies a moral judgment.309  Furthermore, Kennedy states that the 
“concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment” and existing jurisprudence.310 
Kennedy acknowledges that the Court has not consistently applied the test for 
proportionality.311  In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court held that that the Eighth Amendment 
contains “‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality between 
crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
to the crime’”.312  Pursuant to the Harmelin standard, the Court evaluates if a punishment is 
“grossly disproportionate to the crime” by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity 
of the sentence and the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in 
the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.313   
Kennedy also acknowledges a separate line of cases that impose two subsets of 
categorical rules for the Eighth Amendment, including: (1) the nature of the offense, or (2) the 
characteristics of the offender.314  Cases applying the “nature of offense” subset prohibit the 
death penalty for non-homicide offenses.315  Similarly, cases applying the “characteristics of the 
offender” subset prohibit the death penalty for individuals less than 18 years of age or who lack 
                                                 
308 See id. 58; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
309 See id. at 58. 
310 See id. at 59. 
311 See id. 
312 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (emphasis added). 
313 See id. 60 (acknowledging that the Court has upheld life sentences without parole for non-violent felonies.  For 
example, the Court has upheld a sentence of 25 years for defendant’s third offense of stealing golf clubs and upheld 
a life sentence with a possibility of parole for defendant’s third non-violent felony of obtaining money by false 
pretenses). 
314 See id. at 61-62 (acknowledging that these cases predominantly analyze the imposition of the death penalty, no t 
life sentences without parole). 
315 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, as modified (Oct. 1, 2008), opinion modified on denial of reh’g , 554 
U.S. 945 (2008) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for crime of rape of child when death of the victim 
was not the intended result).  
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the requisite intellectual capacity.316  Kennedy asserts that the categorical approach envisions 
that the Court will exercise its own judgment by applying objective indicia of society’s 
standards.317  Kennedy asserts that the categorical approach is applicable in Graham.318  
Considering all objective indicia of society’s standards, the Court held a life sentence without 
parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.319 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion.  Roberts accuses the Court of 
attempting to “invent a new constitutional rule of dubious provenance” to justify the ruling.320  
Roberts reaches the same result, but founded on two separate principles: (1) the “narrowly 
proportionality” standard and (2) judicial precedent set forth in Roper v. Simmons, which gives 
significant weight to the culpability of juvenile offenders.321 
The standard of “narrowly proportionality” directs a court to apply a case-by-case 
analysis of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, keeping in mind that a 
court does not possess absolute power to “second-guess” the decisions of the state legislature or 
sentencing court.322  Roberts disagrees with Kennedy’s application of the proportionality 
standard.323  Roberts clarifies that the court’s threshold inquiry should begin with a comparison 
between the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, considering all relevant 
                                                 
316 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of death penalty for individuals younger 
than 18 years old); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting imposition of death penalty for individual 
with low functioning intellectual capacity). 
317 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (objective indicia of society’s standards include national consensus, judicial 
precedent, and the Eighth Amendment’s text, purpose, history, and meaning). 
318 See id. at 61. 
319 See id. at 67, 68, 71-74, 79, 81 (considering several factors, including: (1) that rarity of sentence showed a 
national consensus opposing the sentence; (2) juvenile offenders lacked diminished moral culpability, particularly in 
non-violent crimes; (3) a life sentence without parole constituted a particularly harsh punishment for a juvenile, who 
will spend more time in prison than an adult sentenced the same; (4) reasons for incarceration, including retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are not served by sentence and will provide little substantive benefit to 
juvenile; (5) the offender’s age and lack of maturity; and (6) global opposition to sentence).  
320 See id. at 86 (Roberts, J. concurring). 
321 See id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). 
322 See id. at 88 (explaining that “narrowly proportionality” standard envisions that state legislature or sentencing 
court decisions will rarely succumb to constitutional challenges ). 
323 See id. 
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factors including mental state and motive.324  Roberts asserts that if, and only if, an inference that 
the punishment is “grossly disproportionate” arises from this threshold inquiry, can the court 
proceed with intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons.325  
Furthermore, Roberts’ asserts that the majority unwisely creates a new constitutional rule 
– that a sentence of life without parole imposed on any juvenile for any non-homicide offense is 
unconstitutional.326  Roberts cautions that the Court’s rule completely undermines the case-by-
case analysis required by existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and is unsuited for cases in 
which the juvenile commits far more heinous non-homicide crimes.327  “[T]he whole enterprise 
of proportionality review”, Roberts explains, “is premised on the ‘justified’ assumption that 
‘courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale’”.328 
Moreover, Roberts stresses the applicability of Roper v. Simmons to justify a less severe 
sentence for Graham and juveniles similarly situated.329  Roberts rebuts the Court’s interpretation 
of Roper as outright banning the imposition of a life sentence without parole on juveniles for 
non-homicide crimes.  Conversely, Roberts interprets Roper as standing for the proposition that 
juveniles may receive such sentences so long as these sentences are “less severe than death”.330  
Roberts stresses that the true benefit of Roper is its emphasis of the offender’s juvenile status as 
central to the inquiry of what constitutes a proportional punishment.331  Roberts finds that 
because Graham’s youth contributed to his reckless behavior and criminal activity as well as his 
                                                 
324 See id. 
325 See id. 
326 See id. at 94. 
327 See id. at 95. 
328 See id. at 96. 
329 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (declaring death penalty for juveniles cruel and unusual punishments 
and articulating three differences between juveniles and adults that demonstrate that juveniles have diminished 
moral capacities and cannot reliably be classified among the “worst offenders”, including: (1) “lack of maturity and 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; (2) greater susceptibility to “negative influences and outside pressures”; 
and (3) a developing character.) 
330 See Graham, 553 U.S. at 90. 
331 Id. at 90. 
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enhanced susceptibility to peer pressure, Graham was markedly less culpable than a typical adult 
who commits the same offenses.332 
Because there is a strong inference that Graham’s life sentence without parole was 
grossly disproportionate to his criminal activity, Roberts proceeds to intra- and inter-
jurisdictional comparisons.333  By analyzing Florida’s sentencing statistics, Roberts agrees with 
the majority that Florida is an outlier in its willingness to impose a life sentence without parole 
on juveniles for non-homicide offenses.334  Roberts concludes that Graham received a much 
harsher sentence than other juveniles.335 
iii. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (Dissent) 
In 2012, the Court reexamined Graham and ultimately extended the ruling of Graham to 
include non-homicide as well as homicide crimes.  The Court analyzed two consolidated cases, 
Jackson v. Hobbs and Miller v. Alabama.  Kuntrell Jackson was 14 when he and two other 
teenagers went to a video store in Arkansas with the intent to rob it.  336   Jackson stayed outside 
while the other two teens entered the store, pulled out a gun, and killed the store clerk.  337  
Jackson was charged as an adult and given a life term without the possibility of parole.338  
Similarly, Evan Miller, a 14-year-old boy from Alabama, was convicted of murder after he and 
another boy beat a 52-year-old neighbor in Alabama after the three had spent the evening 
                                                 
332 See id. at 91-92. 
333 See id. at 93. 
334 See id. 
335 See id. 
336 See Adam Liptak and Ethan Bronner, Justices Bar Mandatory Life Terms for Juveniles, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/justices -bar-mandatory-life-sentences-for-juveniles.html?hp&_r=0, June 25, 
2012. 
337 See id. 
338 See David G. Savage, Supreme Court rules mandatory juvenile life without parole cruel and 
unusual,http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/25/news/la-pn-supreme-court-rules-juvenile-life-without-parole-cruel-
and-unusual-20120625, June 25, 2012. 
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smoking marijuana and playing drinking games.339  The two youths then set fire to the 
neighbor’s home, from which the neighbor died of smoke inhalation.340  Evan Miller was 
charged as an adult and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole.341  
Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which held that mandatory life 
without parole for individuals under the age of 18 at the time of their crime constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.342  Justice Kagan asserts that 
Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons collectively stand for the proposition that the concept 
of proportionality rooted in the Eighth Amendment requires that courts give significant weight to 
a juvenile’s “lessened culpability”, greater “capacity for change”, and enhanced susceptibility to 
peer pressure.343  Therefore, Justice Kagan interprets Graham and Roper to prohibit imposition 
of a state’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders without giving any consideration to their 
status as children.344  Given their diminished culpability, juvenile offenders cannot be subject to 
the same offenses that an adult would be subjected to, even in homicide crimes.345 
Moreover, Kagan asserts that Graham, Roper, and its progeny envision that each child 
receive individualized sentencing, which takes into account several factors, including a 
juvenile’s personal background and upbringing.346  The Court’s repugnance for mandatory life 
without parole for juvenile offenders is premised on the lack of consideration given to the 
juvenile’s family and home environment or other realities that influence the juvenile’s violence 
                                                 
339 See id. 
340 See id. 
341 See Ala. Code § 12–15–34 (1977) (Alabama law required that Miller be tried as a juvenile, but permitted the 
District Attorney to seek removal of Miller’s case to adult court). 
342 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
343 See id. at 2463-64. 
344 See id. at 2466. 
345 See id. 
346 See id. at 2467. 
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and inclination for criminal activity.347  Kagan articulates that in accordance with Graham, 
Ropper, and its progeny a sentencing judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider 
mitigating factors prior to imposing the harshest sentences for juvenile offenders.  348  Therefore, 
by mandating that a juvenile convicted of homicide receive a life sentence without parole, 
regardless of their age, age-related characteristics, or the nature of their crimes, mandatory 
sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas violates the Eighth Amendment’s principle of 
proportionality and ban on cruel and unusual punishment.349 
Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion.350  Roberts acknowledges that while the 
present case “presents grave and challenging questions of morality and social policy”, the 
Court’s role “is to apply the law, not to answer such questions.”351  Roberts asserts that 
controlling Eighth Amendment jurisprudence determining if a punishment is cruel and unusual 
entails a threshold inquiry of the “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in 
legislative enactments and state practice”.352  This threshold inquiry ascertains the “consensus” 
among states in a given sentencing practice and indicates to the court if the sentencing practice at 
issue has deviated from that consensus.353  As such, Roberts meticulously analyzes state 
sentencing guidelines that have increasingly and more frequently used the life-without-parole 
sentence as a means of preventing repeat offenses.354  Roberts finds that many state legislatures 
                                                 
347 See id. at 2468-69. 
348 See id. at 2473 (acknowledging that most states do not have separate penalty provisions for juvenile offenders.  
Of the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole for children, more than half do so by virtue of generally 
applicable penalty provisions, imposing the sentence without regard to age). 
349 See id. at 2475. 
350 Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined. 
351 See id. at 2477 (Roberts, J. dissenting). 
352 See id. at 2477-78 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422 (2008); Roper, 543 
U.S. at 564). 
353 See id. 
354 See id. at 2479 (criticizing the majority’s argument that the reason for the sentence’s frequent use is due to its 
statutorily mandated imposition). 
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clearly see a need for the sentence and have intentionally amended their laws to provide for it.355  
Roberts concludes that the objective evidence demonstrates that the consensus among states is to 
formally require and frequently impose the life imprisonment without parole for homicide 
offenses, regardless of age.356 
Roberts concedes that while Eighth Amendment jurisprudence traditionally considers the 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”, standards of 
decency does not constitute “leniency”. 357  Roberts clarifies the role of the Court, which is to 
leave matters of decency to the national consensus among the states.358  Roberts criticizes the 
Court’s reasoning because it effectively invalidates state and federal laws without any regard for 
the consensus.359  Roberts disapproves of the Court’s rule of law as it undermines legislative 
authority to impose sentencing guidelines and fails to define an outer limit.360 
e. Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments 
i. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
 In 2007, the Roberts Court tackled the issue of race and affirmative action.  In Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, the Court analyzed two public school 
programs, which used race as mechanism for assigning or transferring students to public 
elementary and high schools in their school districts.  Seattle School District No. 1 in 
Washington voluntarily implemented a program, which assigned students to public high schools 
                                                 
355 See id. at 2480 (discussing how one legislature purposely amended their laws to include life-without-parole 
sentences for homicide offenses post-Graham). 
356 See id. at 2478. 
357 See id. 
358 See id. at 2478-79. 
359 See id. at 2481 (arguing that Ropper and Graham specifically affirmed the legality of life-without-parole 
sentences for juvenile offenses who commit homicides).  
360 See id. at 2482. 
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in the Seattle area based on familial relationships and race.361  Pursuant to the program, incoming 
high school students ranked their choice of school.362  However, some of these schools, 
specifically the Ballard School, were particularly popular among the incoming class.363  The 
program dictated that if too many students chose one particular school, the school board could 
utilize certain “tiebreakers”, including race, to determine what schools these students should 
attend.364  The program sought to racially integrate schools with a student population of more 
than 51% white population.365  If an oversubscribed school was not within 10 percentage points 
of the School District’s overall white and non-white racial balance, the District employed a 
tiebreaker that ideally served to bring the school into racial balance.366 
Andy Meeks, an incoming freshman student, had been accepted into the Ballard School, 
but was later denied admission and assigned to another high school as a result of the race 
tiebreaker.367  His mother by and through Parents Involved in Community Schools (“Parents 
Involved”), a nonprofit corporation comprised of parents of aggrieved children, initiated the 
lawsuit against Seattle School District No. 1.368 
The Jefferson County School District in Louisiana implemented a similar program.369  In 
contrast to Seattle, in 1973, a federal court mandated that Jefferson County desegregate its 
                                                 
361 See Coyle, supra. at 33-34, 36 (explaining that Seattle’s primary motivation to imp lement assignment plan was 
due in part to School District’s housing patterns, which caused segregation in Seattle’s  schools). 
362 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007). 
363 See id. at 711 (From 2000-2001, 82% of the incoming high school class selected Ballard as well as three other 
schools, including Nathan Hale, Roosevelt, Garfield, and Franklin, as their top choices. Balla rd, Nathan Hale, and 
Roosevelt possessed a white population that exceeded 51% of the total student population). 
364 See id. (The first tiebreaker provided that school board selected for admission students who have a sibling 
currently enrolled in the chosen school.  The second tiebreaker considered the racial composition of the school and 
the race of each individual student. Finally, if familial relations and race were not sufficient tiebreakers, the school 
board considered geographic proximity to each high school). 
365 See id. 
366 See id. 
367 See id. at 714. 
368 See id. 
369 See id. at 715. 
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schools.370  By 2000, a federal court deemed Jefferson County to have fulfilled its court mandate 
to desegregate.371  Nevertheless, in 2001, Jefferson County voluntarily implemented an 
assignment plan, which assigned children to elementary schools and assessed school transfer 
requests based on race.372 Jefferson County’s program required all non-magnet schools to 
maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent and a maximum black enrollment of 50 
percent.373  Pursuant to the assignment plan, parents of kindergartners, first graders, and students 
new to the district could submit applications indicating a first and second choice among the 
schools within their geographic cluster.374  The district would not assign a student to a school if 
he or she would contribute to the overall racial imbalance at the school.375  Crystal Meredith, a 
Louisville parent, initiated the lawsuit against Jefferson County because her son could not attend 
the kindergarten closest to their home.376 
The Seattle and Jefferson County cases were consolidated prior to Supreme Court 
review.377  By 2007, the composition of the Supreme Court witnessed a significant change, as 
Justices Roberts and Alito ascended to the bench. 378  This change created uncertainty and 
                                                 
370 See id. 
371 See id. at 716. 
372 See id. (At the time, approximately 34 percent of the Jefferson County’s 97,000 students were black while the 
remaining 66 percent were white). 
373 See id. 
374 See id. (Jefferson County’s assignment plan gave significant weight to geographic location and racial makeup). 
375 See id. 
376 See Coyle, supra. at 29. 
377 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711; see Coyle, supra. at 59 (before seeking Supreme Court review, the Sixth 
Circuit held that Jefferson County’s  school board met its burden to establish a compelling interest because it 
articulated the reasons that the Supreme Court approved in Grutter and provided compelling interests and benefits of 
its policy, including improved student education and community support for public schools.  Additionally, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that the policy was narrowly tailored to this compelling interest, avoiding race in a predominant 
and unnecessary way that could harm members of a particular racial group.  The Ninth Circuit, applying the 
reasoning in Grutter, held that Seattle had a compelling interest to secure the education and social benefits of racial 
diversification and ameliorate racial isolation that has resulted from Seattle’s segregated housing patterns.  The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the school district’s right to assign its students to any one of its schools and held that the 
program does not benefit any one particular race to the detriment of the other). 
378 See Coyle, supra. at 88. 
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uneasiness among proponents of the assignment programs as the conservative beliefs of Roberts 
and Alito were well known, but their take on race and affirmative action were not.379 
Roberts, writing for the majority, presented the fundamental issue:  whether a public 
school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may 
choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school 
assignments.380  Chief Justice Roberts stated that when the government distributes burdens or 
benefits on the basis of race, the government’s actions are reviewed under strict scrutiny.381  As 
such, the Seattle and Louisville School Districts were required to demonstrate that the use of race 
in their assignment plans were “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” government 
interest.382  Roberts identified two judicially recognized compelling government interests:  
remedying the effects of past discrimination, specifically segregation, and diversity in higher 
education, as evidenced in Grutter v. Bollinger.383  Roberts found that Jefferson County, like 
Seattle, did not implement its assignment plan for the purposes of remedying the effects of 
intentional discrimination.384  Roberts asserts that the dissent misconstrues the applicability of 
the remedial justification and completely overlooks the fact that Seattle was never deemed 
segregated by law and Jefferson County eliminated all vestiges of its prior status.385 
Next, Roberts addressed the looming issue of the Grutter and Gratz opinions.  First and 
foremost, Roberts iterates throughout his opinion that the specific interest found compelling in 
Grutter was diversity among the student body in higher education institutions.386  Roberts argues 
                                                 
379 See id. 
380 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711. 
381 See id. at 720 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 
(2003)). 
382 See id. 
383 See id. at 720, 721 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)). 
384 See id. 
385 See id. 736-37. 
386 See id. 721, 725 (emphasis added). 
Katerina Mantell 
Professor Wefing – U.S. Supreme Court 
 50 
that the Court in Grutter “expressly articulated key limitations on its holding,” focusing on 
broad-based diversity within the unique context of higher education.387  Roberts critically points 
out that the lower courts and the dissent disregarded the key limitations of Grutter, which did not 
apply to public elementary or high schools such as Seattle and Jefferson County.388  
Even so, Roberts compares the Seattle and Louisville assignment plans to that the 
University of Michigan law’s school affirmative action program, which were upheld in Grutter.  
Roberts argues that the diversity interest of the University of Michigan’s law school did not 
focus on race alone.389  Roberts clarifies that the use of racial classifications in Grutter was part 
of a broader assessment of diversity and not to a mechanism to achieve racial balance among the 
incoming law school population.390  Roberts argues that Grutter stands for the proposition that a 
plan premised solely on the basis of balancing races is unconstitutional.391  Hence, Roberts 
distinguishes Grutter from Parents Involved because the Seattle and Jefferson County 
assignment plans did not consider race as part of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints”.392 
Seattle and Jefferson County argued that, unlike Grutter, the districts instituted 
assignment plans on the basis of race in the effort to directly promote racial diversity and not 
broader diversity.393  As such, the Seattle’s tiebreaker plan and Louisville’s racial integration 
plan furthered this intended purpose.  Roberts rejects this argument.  Rather, Roberts concludes 
that such plans are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social 
                                                 
387 See id. at 725 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327, 328, 334). 
388 See id. 
389 See id. at 722 (citing Grutter, supra. at 337) 
390 See id. at 722. 
391 See id. at 722-23. 
392 See id. at 723 (citing Grutter, supra. at 330). 
393 See id. 
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benefits associated with racial diversity, but rather only seek to ensure numerical balance.394 
Roberts forewarned that to allow racial balancing as a compelling end in of itself would ensure 
that it would forever be used, to initially obtain an appropriate mix of race and to continue the 
existence of this appropriate mix.395  In conclusion, Roberts determines that the assignment plans 
were more akin to the affirmative action program struck down in Gratz in that Seattle and 
Jefferson County, like the University of Michigan’s undergraduate school, utilized race in a 
mechanical non-individualized way.396   
Roberts rejected supplemental arguments made by Seattle and Jefferson County.  Seattle 
contended that the use of race as a tiebreaker in its assignment plan reduced imbalanced racial 
concentration in schools and ensured that racially concentrated housing patterns did not prevent 
non-white students from accessing Seattle’s most desirable schools.397  Similarly, Jefferson 
County articulated a similar goal, which sought to educate its students in a racially integrated 
environment.398  Roberts concluded that Seattle and Jefferson County failed to demonstrate that 
their plans furthered these goals.399  Moreover, Roberts determined that the assignment plans had 
minimal effect on minority populations, by only shifting a small number of students between 
schools, and that any marginal changes in student population outweighed the cost of subjecting 
students to disparate treatment based solely upon race.400   
                                                 
394 See id. at 726, 727. 
395 See id. at 730-31. 
396 See id. at 724 (To illustrate this point, Roberts explains the inherent problems in Seattle’s assignment plan, which 
classified students as white or non-white.  Roberts adjudges that a high school with 50 percent Asian American 
students and 50 percent white students but no African American, Native American, or Latino students qualified as 
balanced, whereas a school with 30 percent Asian American, 25 percent African American, 25 percent Latino, and 
20 percent white students would not). 
397 See id. at 725. 
398 See id.  
399 See id. at 727 (In support of this, Roberts found that Seattle did not demonstrate how the educational and social 
benefits of racial diversity were more likely achieved at a school that was 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian 
American, which qualified as diverse under Seattle’s plan, than at a school that was 30 percent Asian American, 25 
percent African American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white). 
400 See id. at 733. 
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Roberts finalizes his opinion with an analysis of Brown v. Board of Education.401  
Roberts contends that racial balancing undermines the fundamental principle of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and its progeny of case law, which protects individuals, not 
groups.402  Dividing individuals into racial groups promotes racial inferiority and endorses race-
based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs.403  Roberts suggests 
that Seattle and Jefferson County did exactly what Brown and its progeny prohibit, they used 
race as a factor in affording educational opportunities to some groups and not others.404  In the 
final paragraph of his opinion, Roberts advocates that, 
For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or 
that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson 
County, the way ‘to achieve a system of determining admission to the 
public schools on a nonracial basis,’ is to stop assigning students on a 
racial basis.  The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”405 
 
Roberts insists that it is possible to eliminate racial discrimination within the nation’s schools by 
simply ignoring race, or at least implementing policies that without any reference to race.406 
ii. United States v. Windsor (2013) (Dissent) 
In May 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).407  Section 3 of 
DOMA defined “marriage” for purposes of federal law as the “legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife”.408  Additionally, it defined a “spouse” as a “person of the 
                                                 
401 See id. at 742. 
402 See id. at 746 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) for premise that group 
classifications, no matter how benign, are inherently suspect and should be strictly prohibited ). 
403 See id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955) (Brown II)). 
404 See id. at 747. 
405 See id. (citations omitted). 
406 See id. 
407 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
408 See Definition of “Marriage” and “Spouse”, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2006). 
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opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”409  Since DOMA did not recognize same-sex marriage 
under federal law it effectively barred same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits. 
In 2007, Edith Windsor married her long-time partner, Thea Spyer, in Toronto, Canada, 
after a forty-year engagement. 410  Windsor and Spyer resided in New York at this time.  New 
York recognized same-sex marriage and gave Full Faith and Credit to marriages entered into in 
other states or foreign jurisdictions.411  In 2009, Spyer passed away.  Unfortunately, DOMA 
prevented the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) from treating Windsor as Spyer’s spouse under 
federal law, costing her more than $363,000 thousand dollars in federal estate taxes.412  Shortly 
thereafter, Windsor was referred to Roberta Kaplan, at the firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton 
& Garrison, who previously challenged New York’s gay marriage ban.413  The American Civil 
Liberties Union later joined Kaplan in the Windsor case. 414 
By 2010, sentiments regarding same-sex marriage had fundamentally changed.415  The 
Obama Administration announced that while it would continue to enforce the law, it would not 
defend the law in court.416  Accordingly, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) 
mounted a defense of Section 3 when the Obama administration refused to do so.417 
                                                 
409 See id. 
410 See Peter Applebome, Reveling in Her Supreme Court Moment, NY Times, Dec. 10, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/nyregion/edith-windsor-gay-widow-revels-in-supreme-court-fight.html. 
411 See id. 
412 See id. 
413 See id. 
414 See id. 
415 See John Schwartz, Gay Couples to Sue Over U.S. Marriage Law, NYTims.com, Nov. 8, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/us/09marriage.html?_r=0. 
416 See Office of Attorney General, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Press Release, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-
attorney-general-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act. 
417 See Basil Katz, Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional: Judge , Reuters, June 6, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/us-usa-gaymarriage-idUSBRE8551JW20120606 (The United States 
District Court for the District of New York held that Windsor should receive a refund for the federal estate taxes.  
The Government did not challenge this ruling.  As such, BLAG stepped in in defense of DOMA when the case 
reached the Supreme Court; see also Decision, Windsor v. United States, F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion.418  Kennedy asserts, first and foremost, that 
Section 3 of DOMA does not forbid individual states from enacting laws that recognize same-sex 
marriage or providing state benefits to individuals in same-sex marriages.419  Kennedy criticizes 
DOMA for departing from long-established precedent that affords individuals states the power to 
define and regulate marriage and domestic relations and that guarantees that all incidents, 
benefits, and obligations derived from marriage to be uniform within each state.420  Kennedy 
contends that “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance…apart 
from the principles of federalism”.421  Although Kennedy alludes to the principles of federalism, 
he does not declare DOMA unconstitutional based upon those principles. 
 Instead, the Court’s ruling is predicated on the Fifth Amendment and the liberty interests 
it protects.422  Kennedy discerns the true purpose and practical effect of DOMA: to impose a 
“disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma” on same-sex couples.423  Kennedy finds 
support of this contention in DOMA’s legislative history of enactment and text, which expressed 
moral disapproval of homosexuality and pronounced a moral conviction that heterosexuality 
comported with traditional morality.424  Kennedy concludes that by creating two contradictory 
marriage regimes DOMA deprives couples of the rights, responsibilities, and benefits under 
federal law, including numerous federal regulations that control laws pertaining to social 
security, healthcare, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, veterans’ benefits, and 
                                                 
418 The Court did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which does not require states that do not recognize same -sex 
marriage to give Full Faith and Credit to same-sex marriages entered into in other states. See Certain acts, records, 
and proceedings and the effect thereof, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2013). 
419 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
420 See id. at 2692. 
421 See id. 
422 See id. at 2693. 
423 See id. 
424 See id. at 2693 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 104–664, pp. 12–13 (1996)). 
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bankruptcy protection.425  Kennedy argues that there is no legitimate government interest to deny 
the class of same-sex couples protection of personhood, dignity, and equal protection of the 
laws.426  Kennedy declares DOMA unconstitutional because it singles out a class of persons and 
treats this class as less respected than others in violation of the Fifth Amendment.427 
 In contrast, Roberts votes to uphold DOMA in a brief four-page dissent.428  Roberts 
attacks Kennedy’s decision to declare DOMA unconstitutional on three fronts: (1) congressional 
intent; (2) uniformity and stability; and (3) state’s rights and federalism.  Roberts explains that in 
1996 federal and state governments acted in unanimity in defining marriage and the class of 
individuals entitled to the incidents, benefits, and obligations derived therefrom.429  “Interests in 
uniformity and stability”, Roberts asserts, “amply justified” Congress’ decision to define 
marriage as a union between one man and one woman.430  Additionally, Roberts’ asserts that 
because Congress’ intentions did not vary so greatly from the states, it is incorrect to claim that it 
acted with malice or imposed a discriminatory law without a legitimate government interest.431  
Roberts “would not tar the political branches with the brush of bigotry” without a stronger 
showing that Congress codified the definition with malice.432 
 Furthermore, Roberts seeks to clarify an ambiguity that may arise from the majority’s 
opinion.  Roberts asserts that the decision does not decide nor constrict state power to define 
marriage.433  While the majority’s decision to strike down DOMA relies heavily on state power 
                                                 
425 See id. at 2690. 
426 See id. at 2696. 
427 See id. 
428 See id. (Roberts drafted a separate dissent on the constitutionality of DOMA, but joined Justice Scalia’s dissent 
on standing and jurisdiction). 
429 See id. 
430 See id. 
431 See id. 
432 Id. at 2692 (Kennedy, J. opinion) (concluding that the H.R.Rep. No. 104–664, pp. 12–13 (1996) constitutes 
“strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class”).  
433 See id. at 2697. 
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to define marital relations, the constitutionality of that power will only come into play in future 
cases about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions.434  Therefore, the basic notions of 
federalism authorize each state to define marriage in a way that is different from its neighbor.435  
Roberts does not interpret DOMA to infringe on that right.436  
PART III:  ANALYSIS 
a. Article I and Article II Federal Power 
i. Federal Power and Healthcare 
When President Bush nominated John Roberts for the position of Chief Justice, Roberts 
expressed the intent to continue his successors’ legacy.437  However, Roberts’ judicial 
philosophy is distinct from that of Rehnquist’s in that Roberts seeks to build a consensus among 
his colleagues, who remain evenly split between two conflicting ideologies.  The burdensome 
task of creating consensus requires Roberts to diverge from a right-wing conservative ideology. 
The Health Care Case exemplifies Roberts’ attempt to build a consensus among his 
colleagues, but in accordance with his judicial philosophy.  While Justice Roberts did not vote in 
line with his conservative colleagues, his opinion consistently articulates a conservative theme of 
restraint on federal power.  Roberts sifts through years of American history to demonstrate the 
consistency of this theme and the importance of adhering to it.438  This is not to suggest that if 
historical, judicial, or legislative precedent existed to authorize such expansive federal powers 
that Roberts would flatly reject it.  Roberts concedes that “legislative novelty is not necessarily 
fatal”, that “there is a first time for everything,” but this case did not warrant such novelty.439 
                                                 
434 See id. 
435 See id. 
436 See id. 
437 See Baker, supra. at 2. 
438 See Sebelius, 131 S.Ct. 2588 (referencing James Madison’s The Federalist No. 45, at 293, which envisions a 
broad power of Congress to expand the nation’s economy , but imposes explicit limitations on this power).   
439 See id. at 2586. 
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As Chief Justice, Robert’s must police the limits of federal power and ensure that the 
federal government plays by the rules.  Sebelius in no way relegates the federal government to 
state of austerity; it simply institutes a carefully considered, clearly articulated boundary line of 
which this Court and future courts must consider.  As the Umpire of the Court, Roberts called the 
shots.  Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor the most-far reaching judicial precedent 
allowed the government to regulate what Roberts considers inactivity.  Congress overstepped its 
bounds.  Congress struck out. 
As leader and Umpire of the Court, Roberts is tasked with providing a workable rule of 
law that can be easily understood and applied consistently in the future.  To illuminate the 
importance of restraint on federal power, Roberts relies on a “slippery-slope” hypothetical, also 
known as the “broccoli horrible”.  In actuality, the “broccoli horrible” is most likely a 
“hypothetical and unreal impossibility”.440  However, Roberts portrays the federal government as 
a big brother-like state to emphasize the inevitable consequences of a court that fails to impose 
an outer limit.  The “broccoli horrible” constitutes a valid cautionary tale; a dramatization of 
what could happen, even if highly unlikely. 
Some have criticized Roberts for the Sebelius decision because he expressed utter disdain 
for the mandate, yet he chose to save it.441   This criticism is misplaced for two reasons.  First, 
Roberts’ action to save the ACA in no way makes him a champion of the liberal front.  By 
labeling it a tax, in spite of Obama’s express statements to the contrary, Roberts circumvents the 
                                                 
440 See id. at 2591, 2625 (there is nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence or Sebelius to suggest that liberal or 
conservative justices would permit such an invasion in the interests of the national economy or the Union);  see also 
Tribe, supra. at 65, 73; but see Let’s Move Initiative, Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.letsmove.gov/lear-facts/epidemic-
childhood-obesity (Michelle Obama launched the Let’s Move Initiative, which implemented several programs to 
manage and prevent child obesity and to provide healthier foods in the nation’s schools, ensure that every family has 
access to healthy, affordable food, and promote greater physical activity); see also Tribe, supra. at 65, 73. 
441 See Tribe, supra. at 56 (“The new law is nothing if not complex…Many of its provisions are s till being 
interpreted and implemented, a process that will continue for years to come and affect virtually ever patient, doctor, 
hospital, and branch of government.”). 
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federal government’s intent to pass innovative social legislation and lumps the mandate in with 
ordinary things that the Government taxes, including gasoline or earned income.442  Roberts 
limited federal power where it could be most aggressive, i.e., the Commerce and the Necessary 
Proper clauses.  Additionally, by interpreting the mandate as a tax, Roberts places the burden on 
the government to administer the tax, regulate transactions, and defend the ACA’s deficiencies. 
Secondly, as Umpire, Roberts must call the shots fairly and objectively within the bounds 
of the law and with deference to political and judicial institutions.  Throughout his opinion, 
Roberts acknowledges the necessity of insurance reform, but refused to expand Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper clause powers any farther than the Court previously affixed.  In order to 
uphold this necessity, Roberts articulated a reasonable alternative and moderately broad federal 
power, i.e., the taxing power.  While Roberts effectively stripped the mandate of its regulatory 
nature, he upheld the mandate with all of its provisions.  As Umpire, Roberts allowed the federal 
government a base run; it received judicial authority to regulate and administer the mandate in a 
reasonable manner and within bounds of the Constitution and judicial precedent. 
ii. Federal Power and National Security 
  Moving back several years to 2004, the Roberts Court walked a delicate line in its 
consideration of the Bush Administration’s War on Terror policies.  The Court was stuck 
between a rock and a hard place.  The Constitution gave the President express powers to manage 
war and military operations.443  However, Bush’s abuse of such expansive power could not 
remain unchecked without some degree of judicial oversight.444  
                                                 
442 See Sebelius, 131 S.Ct. at 2594. 
443 See U.S. Const. Art. II, § 8, Cl. 11. 
444 See Coyle, supra. at 192; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (O’Connor, J. majority) (reaffirming that war 
does not give the President a blank check when it comes to the Nation’s citizens). 
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 President Bush nominated Roberts to the bench.  Roberts also worked in the Solicitor 
Attorney General’s Office during Bush Sr.’s administration. 445   Roberts has maintained close 
affiliations with President Bush and the Republican Party.446  Therefore, it seemed logical that 
Roberts would vote in favor of the Bush Administration’s policies, granting extensive wartime 
powers to both the President and Congress. 
As the Umpire, Roberts fairly and objectively reviewed judicial precedent and analyzed 
the statutory structure and legislative intent of the DTA and MCA.  By surveying and adhering to 
the Court’s recent precedent, Roberts recognizes that the Court provided the federal government 
the legal basis to enact the DTA and MCA.  Roberts is methodic in his legal analysis, 
meticulously comparing each provision of the DTA and MCA to the preferred structures 
described in Hamdi and its progeny.447  Roberts does not suggest that President Bush or 
Congress should receive a blank check during wartime, but in the case of Boumediene, the 
federal government hit a homerun.   
The opinions of Roberts and Kennedy could not have been any more inapposite.  
Kennedy composed an opinion that reflected his deep fascination with individual liberty and 
constitutional structure. 448  He surveyed countless centuries of English and American history. 449   
He then discussed the benefits of judicial intervention, with the judiciary acting as champion of 
individual liberty as well as vindication for the federal government’s policies.450  In response, 
                                                 
445 See Tribe, supra. at 20.   
446 This logic played out while Roberts sat on the D.C. Circuit.  On July 15, 2005, the D.C. Circuit ruled and 
unanimously held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that military commissions, approved and statutorily enacted by Congress, 
constituted legitimate forums to try enemy combatants and that detainees could be  tried before military commissions 
prior to a determination of their prisoner of war status. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, July 18, 2005. 
447 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787-92; see also Coyle, supra. at 195. 
448 See Coyle, supra. at 198. 
449 See id. 
450 See id. 
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Roberts confirms that such judicial activism is neither the role of the Court nor a fair, objective, 
or legally sound precedent to make. 
b. Analysis of First Amendment Rights 
The Roberts Court faced tremendous criticism for its decision in Citizens United and 
Bennett.451  Commentators suggested that the Roberts Court completely underestimated the 
relative ease in which independent expenditures could coordinate activities of candidates so long 
as they did not formally coordinate expenditures with candidates.452  Additionally, some suggest 
that the Court miscalculated the influence of independent expenditures and how such influence 
can spawn the appearance of corruption even if a quid pro quo exchange does not take place.453 
Because contemporary campaign finance jurisprudence interprets corruption to be tethered 
tightly to quid pro quo corruption, such as the sale of public office, some argue that this 
interpretation overlooks the effects of covert money in politics, which undermines the electoral 
integrity and fosters public diffidence in the electoral process.454 
These concerns may be valid, but they do not provide a workable rule for First 
Amendment free speech rights.  Citizens United and Bennett represent Roberts’ attempts to 
Umpire a close game.  The government came up to bat and championed adherence to the pro-
Austin rationale, dictating that corporate wealth distorted open and public discussion of 
campaign issues.455  In contrast, individual candidates and independent expenditure groups came 
up to bat and advocated adherence to the pro-Buckley rationale, which provided First 
                                                 
451 See Tribe, supra. at 88-89. 
452 Ibid. at 89. 
453 See id. at 102. 
454 See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1563, 1603 (2012); Robert F. 
Bauer, The Varieties of Corruption and the Problem of Appearance: A Response to Professor Samaha , 125 Harv. L. 
Rev. F. 91, 94, 96 (2012) (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006), which found that “the interests 
underlying contribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, ‘directly implicate the 
integrity of our electoral process.’ Yet that rationale does not simply mean ‘the lower the limit, the better.’”) . 
455 See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, New York Time, Jan. 21, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Amendment protections regardless of corporate form.  The government struck out.  Roberts 
defined and adhered to one rule of law: a campaign finance law premised on an equality interest 
or an intent to level the electoral playing field between privately and publicly funded candidates 
violate First Amendment rights.  This rule of law targets what Roberts considered inconsistencies 
in the Court’s jurisprudence.456 
In our current political system, candidates are dependent on the people’s votes, but they 
are also dependent upon those individuals or groups who have the means to fund a successful 
campaign.457  The potential for untoward influences in the electoral process do not justify 
limitations on such funding.  Roberts recognizes the success of other mechanisms to control the 
accumulation of wealth in the electoral marketplace, including disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements as well as contribution limitations, that will not undermine the First Amendment’s 
right to engage in free speech without unjustified government intrusion.458 
c. Exceptions for Warrantless Search and Seizure under Fourth Amendment 
The justices in Georgia v. Randolph strongly disagreed over the applicability of Fourth 
Amendment precedent and the permissibility of creating an exception to this precedent.  As the 
Umpire, Roberts sought to build consensus around narrow opinions that adhered to preceding 
third-party consent cases.  Roberts sifted through earlier cases, considered their facts in light of 
what was argued, discerned new trends, and clarified peculiar outcomes of the case.  In sifting 
through earlier cases, Roberts concluded that the Court lacked legal justification for evaluating 
Randolph differently from preceding third-party consent cases.  Roberts did not consider the 
                                                 
456 See Richard L. Hasen, Is "Dependence Corruption" Distinct from A Political Equality Argument for Campaign 
Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 Election L.J. 305, 307 (2013) (arguing that Austin provided 
Congress tremendous discretion to restrict speech by the news media and other widely recognized politically 
motivated entities or groups and that such a bleak view of independent expenditure groups and privately funded 
candidates did not justify leveling the playing field). 
457 See Hasen, supra. at 309. 
458 See Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2812. 
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slight distinction in the facts of Randolph and these preceding cases to warrant an exception or a 
new trend in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.459   
Roberts then ventured into the realm of hypotheticals to show the peculiar outcome of the 
Court’s ruling.  In Randolph, Roberts describes an incident where the police arrive at scene of 
domestic violence.  Scholarly critics suggest that Roberts’ discussion of domestic violence was 
an “appeal to a kind of loaded imagery” and outside of the scope of Randolph, but these critics 
impute facts to create a hypothetical situation Roberts’ never intended to create.460  The 
imputation of facts into Roberts’ realistic scenario muddles his intent to show the peculiarity of 
the majority’s reasoning.  The Court affirmed, inter alio, that the Fourth Amendment affords the 
“home” special protections from government intrusion. 461  In accordance with the Court’s 
reasoning, “widely shared social expectations” and “customary social usage” would influence the 
police to leave the alleged victim behind just because the other occupant, i.e., the abuser, tells 
them to “stay out”.462  Thus, the Court safeguards the home at the expense of the abused spouse.  
This hypothetical scenario realistically demonstrates the peculiarity the Randolph’s precedent. 
In spite of the majority’s contentions, Roberts neither intended to decide Randolph on a 
hypothetical scenario nor obstinately prohibit any exceptions to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  As Umpire, it is Roberts’ duty to build a consensus among the justices while 
advancing narrow precedent to prevent future constitutional dissention or confusion.   As 
                                                 
459 See C. Dan Black, Georgia v. Randolph: A Murky Refinement of the Fourth Amendment Third -Party Consent 
Doctrine, 42 Gonz. L. Rev. 321, 329-30 (2007) (Roberts affirmed that Rodriguez, Matlock , and Randolph were 
factually similar in that defendants in these cases had an unjustified expectation of privacy and had assumed risk that 
their co-occupants could allow entry of parties adverse to their interests, irrespective of defendant’s presence). 
460 See Daniel Manne, Trouble at Home, 40 Rutgers L. Rec. 188, 213-14 (2013) (Imputing imagery of a wife 
standing in the doorway with a “black eye” and claiming that Roberts’ appeal to his imaginary scenario “is nothing 
more than a red herring” because the police in Randolph did not have probable cause to believe that any crime had 
occurred.  In contrast, in Roberts’ imaginary scenario, the police would have probable cause to believe that a crime, 
i.e., domestic violence, occurred.  Therefore, police entry in Roberts’ scenario would be premised on probable cause, 
rather than co-occupant consent). 
461 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 511. 
462 See id. 
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Umpire, Roberts called the shots.  He concluded that Scott Randolph should have struck out 
because the Court diverged from judicial precedent and set forth an unworkable rule of law.463 
d. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
Roberts’ interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is predicated solely on existing judicial 
precedent and evolving societal standards of a national consensus among states.  As the Umpire, 
Roberts fairly and objectively evaluates earlier cases, considers their factual distinctions in light 
of what was argued, discerns new trends among the states, and clarifies any peculiar outcomes of 
the case.  The role of the Court and legislative power supports his determination that matters of 
morality were not necessary to resolve the dispute at issue. 464 
Baze v. Rees, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama represent the Roberts’ appeal to 
narrow opinions, especially in cases that pose tremendous constitutional and legislative 
implications.  For example, in Graham v. Florida, Roberts employed his conservative, 
minimalist philosophy to declare unconstitutional the mandatory imposition of life without 
parole on Graham, not the sentence in of itself.465  Roberts agreed that Graham’s sentence 
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, but he advocated 
for a ruling premised on strict application of the proportionality standard that considered the 
particular defendant and particular crime at issue.  He discerned a new trend based on the 
                                                 
463 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (reconsidering Randolph and holding that when an 
objecting co-occupant present, but later removed from premises for objectively reasonable purposes, such as lawful 
arrest, remaining occupant may validly consent to entry and search). 
464 See Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court's "Kids 
Are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down A Blind Alley , 46 Akron L. Rev. 489, 516 (2013). 
465 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 4, 8, 17-19 (1999) 
(describing Justice Roberts's majority opinion in the health care law case as an exercise in “minimalis m and self-
control” that was a positive development for the law and the people). 
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national consensus, but he did not agree that Graham’s case necessitated the creation of a new 
legal precedent.466 
Similarly, Roberts’ conservative and minimalist judicial philosophy fueled his dissent in 
Miller, wherein he criticized the Court for straying from its narrowly tailored precedent and 
disregarding the national consensus.  Roberts details the peculiar outcome of the majority’s 
decision, which in effect subjected 29 states to revision of sentencing procedures and 
reconsideration of sentences for an estimated 5,000 juvenile inmates serving life without parole 
for homicide offenses.467  This peculiar outcome could have been avoided had the Court not 
strayed so far from the constraints of the law and widely accepted standards societal standards.   
As Umpire, Roberts sets aside his personal views to devise a workable rule of law that 
legislatures and the Court can use as a basis to avoid larger constitutional and moral issues. 468  
Roberts was raised a devout Catholic and continues to actively practices his religion.469  
However, Roberts prefers to keep that aspect of his life private, separate and apart from his 
public role as judge.470  His devout Catholicism likely fostered his conservative ideologies, but 
his role as Chief Justice is to call the shots fairly and objectively and without any reference to his 
personal views.  If the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy expressed a moral or religious 
preference, it would fundamentally undermine his role as the Umpire.  Therefore, Roberts’ 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of existing precedent and a 
national consensus among states to maintain uniformity, predictability, and impartiality in the 
Court’s jurisprudence. 
                                                 
466 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (concluding that the Court could have 
resolved Graham’s case without establishing a new precedent, that a life sentence without parole was prohibited for 
any juvenile for any non-homicide offense). 
467 See Mary Berkheiser, supra. at 516. 
468 See id. at 514-15. 
469 See Purdum, supra. at 6. 
470 See id. 
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e. Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments 
i. Opinions Considering Race and the Fourteenth Amendment 
The outcome of Parents Involved was especially significant for the Roberts Court as it 
brought the landmark ruling of Brown v. Board of Education as well as affirmative action cases 
to the forefront.471  The Court had never ruled on an affirmative action case where the aggrieved 
parties challenged the voluntary use of race to achieve the benefits of diversity and to end racial 
isolation in public elementary and high schools.472  Rather, the Court continuously exercised its 
authority to enforce Brown as many states repeatedly enacted policies that frustrated 
desegregation or simply refused to take affirmative steps to desegregate public schools.473  
Alternatively, prior to Parents Involved, the Court considered several affirmative action 
programs implemented at high educational institutions, which set forth a threshold analysis for 
determining the constitutionality of future programs.474 
                                                 
471 Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (The Court held that state laws establishing separate public 
schools for black and white students were unconstitutional, as these laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In the words of the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, separate public educational 
facilities were inherently unequal.  Even if the state-operated segregated black and white schools were of equal 
quality in facilities and teachers, segregation was inherently harmful to black students and in violat ion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
472 See Coyle, supra. at 30. 
473 Compare Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that Virginia school board maintains an 
affirmat ive duty to take whatever steps necessary to desegregate the unitary white school system), Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education , 402 U.S. 1 (1970) (upholding North Caro lina’s mandatory busing 
policy as an appropriate remedy for the racial imbalance in its schools), Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 
(1973) (holding that while the Denver school implemented program that mandated or permitted racial segregation, it 
instituted policies that manifested and maintained racially  and ethnically segregated schools), with Miliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that boundary lines between 53 school districts in Detroit  were not drawn 
with the intent to racially segregate all d istricts and the effect of these boundary lines did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
474 Compare Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down the admissions 
policy of the University of California, Davis’ medical school, which reserved sixteen spots for minority students out 
of the 100 students enrolled annually in the program, because the admissions policy was not absolutely necessary to 
achieve the compelling goal of racial diversity, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down admissions 
policy of the University of Michigan’s undergraduate school for failing the heightened scrutiny test because the 
policy automatically awarded 20 points to minority students without individually assessing each applicant),  with 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the admissions policy of the University of Michigan’s law 
school because the policy considered race as one of many factors, not the dominant factor, during the individual 
assessment of each applicant). 
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Roberts’ opinion on race is premised in part on his belief that the country is best served 
by race neutral programs and that the country has evolved markedly since Brown v. Board of 
Education.  The dissent does not deny that the country has evolved, but it attributes such 
evolution to affirmative action programs.475  The plurality and the dissent diverge on how the 
Seattle and Jefferson County programs brought about change in those school districts and 
whether race was truly necessary to bring out those changes.476  The dissent clarifies what it 
deems to be fallacies in the plurality opinion; specifically, that the implementation of affirmative 
action or assignments plans that explicitly use racial criteria suggests that such criteria has an 
important and necessary role to play in remedying the lingering effects of racial segregation.477  
Parents Involved is difficult to rectify with Roberts’ childhood upbringing.  Roberts 
enjoyed the financial benefits of his father’s executive position at Bethlehem steel.  However, 
Roberts worked with lower class individuals in the steel mills, interacting with many individuals 
whom would likely never attend college.478  He witnessed firsthand that not everyone is born 
with a silver spoon in their mouth or possess the intellectual prowess that Roberts possessed.  For 
this reason, Roberts’ race-neutral viewpoint does not stem from a disconnect with the common 
man.  Rather, it predicated on his interpretation of the law, his efforts to set an outer limit on 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, and his hope that the Country and the Court can 
rise above the inequality that results from classifying based on race.   
                                                 
475 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 860-61 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
476 See Coyle, supra. at 31 (For example, in 2000, Ballard’s racial composition consisted of 70-30 white to non-
white students.  By 2003, the school’s racial composition consisted of 57-43 white to non-white students); but see 
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724 (Roberts, J.) (discussing Seattle’s assignment plan and determining that white or 
non-white differentiation lead to peculiar results). 
477 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 860-61 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
478 See Purdum, supra. at 3. 
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The plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment is race-neutral in that all incidents, 
benefits, and obligations attributed by law must be applied to all individuals equally.  479  It makes 
no mention of race, creed, or gender and in effect is colorblind. 480  Any practice, policy, or 
program that affords benefits to one class of individuals, but not another violates the plain 
language of the statute.  Nevertheless, the Court has recognized several permissible exceptions to 
this rule as a means of carrying out the Amendment’s intended purpose, which was to end state-
sponsored discrimination.481  The Constitution set the floor while existing Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence set the outer limit.  The outer limit explicitly held that any program or 
policy that considers race as the predominant factor in affording an individual incidents, benefits, 
or obligations of such program or policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment.482  Like Rehnquist, 
Roberts adheres to a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to ensure 
that the Court and legislatures do not stray too far from that outer limit. 
As Umpire, Roberts analyzes the Seattle and Jefferson County programs within this outer 
limit.483  Roberts called the shots: the assignment plans exceeded the outer limit of existing 
precedent as both plans considered race a predominant factor in an effort to obtain a specific 
quota of a racial class.  Seattle and Jefferson County struck out. 
i. Opinions Considering Fifth Amendment Protection of Marriage Rights 
Roberts’ dissent in Windsor provides a very terse legal analysis.  The brevity of Roberts’ 
opinion was likely influenced by his decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry.484  In Windsor, like 
                                                 
479 See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. 
480 See id.; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J. concurring); but see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 829 
(Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880)). 
481 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 753-54 (Roberts, J.) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (U.S. 1971)). 
482 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720, 723 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275). 
483 See id. 
484 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (declaring that the parties lacked standing because the only 
individuals who sought to appeal were those official proponents who had intervened in the District Court, but the 
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Hollingsworth, Justice Roberts dismissed the case for lack of standing and avoided the difficult 
task of a ruling on its substantive merits.485 
Roberts does not interpret Windsor or Hollingsworth to symbolize the Court’s approval 
of same-sex marriage nationwide.  Neither Windsor nor Hollingsworth set forth any judicial 
precedent interpreting the extent of same-sex marriage rights under the Fourteenth or Fifth 
Amendments.  Rather, these cases simply codify the fine line between federal and state 
governments and each governing body’s authority to define marriage in the realms in which they 
govern. 486  This analysis falls squarely in line with Roberts’ judicial philosophy in that federal 
and state institutions of government and their decisionmaking authority should be respected. 
Roberts clarifies the Court’s role, which is to give deference to these institutions unless such 
institutions overstep constitutional or judicial precedent.  As Umpire, Roberts fairly and 
objectively weighs DOMA’s legislative history, congressional intent at the time of its enactment, 
and the national consensus among states to conclude that Congress and individual states lawfully 
exercised their decisionmaking authority.487 
Additionally, Roberts’ conservative and minimalist philosophy surfaces in Windsor.  He 
did not intend to decide any more than Windsor required.  Federalism principles adequately 
                                                                                                                                                             
proponents had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything.  Their only interest in appealing was to 
uphold the constitutionality of generally applicable law.  Roberts stated, “[a]s this Court has repeatedly held such a 
‘generalized grievance’—no matter how sincere—is insufficient to confer standing.”). 
485 See Maura Dolan, Judge Strikes Down Prop. 8, Allows Gay Marriage in California [Updated] , 
latimesblogs.com, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/08/prop8-gay-marriage.html, Aug. 4, 2010 (The facts 
of Hollingsworth are quite similar to that of Windsor.  Like Edith Windsor, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, the 
aggrieved parties in Hollingsworth, initiated a case against Los Angeles County court clerks and California officials 
after Perry and Stier had been denied a marriage license because they were a same-sex couple.  The aggrieved 
parties brought suit in federal district court.  The federal district court judge entered a decision in favor of Perry and 
Stier, overturning Proposition 8 based on Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The State of California did not appeal the decision.  Instead, official proponents of Proposition 8 challenged it.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision.  Proponents of Prop osition 8 appealed 
the decision to the Supreme Court) 
486 See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, J. dissenting); see also Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2705 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
487 See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696-97. 
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resolved the matter at issue and as such, he declined to address the Fifth Amendment equal 
protection argument.488 
Nevertheless, by interpreting Windsor as a federalism issue, Roberts ignores an 
inconsistency in the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.  Specifically, the Court has 
continually failed to announce a standard of review with regards to due process or equal 
protection claims in the context of sexual orientation.489  Under a rational basis review, it is 
unclear if a court would find irrational any reason proffered by a state for imposing a same-sex 
marriage ban.490  This has significant implications for same-sex couples seeking protection under 
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses as lower courts are free to apply this any standard 
of review to suit their ideological preferences.491  By shying away from the same-sex marriage 
issue, Roberts permits lower courts to run amuck with his court’s jurisprudence, inserting a rule 
of law and standard of review with no discernable outer limit.492  As Umpire and leader of the 
Court, Roberts should have clarified the plurality’s unclear articulation of a standard of review in 
sexual orientation cases.493  By shying away from the issue now, the Umpire places the burden 
on state legislatures to solve outstanding disputes. 494 
                                                 
488 See id. 
489 See id.; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
490 Compare De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Windsor and applying rational 
basis test to strike down Texas’ ban on same-sex marriage), with Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny and declaring unconstitutional Pennsylvania statute that banned 
same-sex marriage and refused to afford Full Faith and Credit to same-marriages entered into in other states); see 
also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 289 Conn. 135, 160 (2008) (applying intermediate scrutiny), and Varnum 
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CONCLUSION 
 Roberts holds firmly to his belief that his role is to act like the Umpire of the Court.  He 
consistently approaches each case in a methodical way, sifting through judicial precedent, 
discerning new trends, and rectifying any inconsistencies in the Court’s legal or factual analysis.  
With this methodical analysis, Roberts decides if the parties struck out, circled the bases, or hit a 
homerun.  While Roberts welcomes the creation of new precedent where warranted, he 
consistently advocates for the principled and intelligible evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
Roberts’ respect for judicial precedent, his role as Chief Justice, and narrowly tailored opinions 
marks Roberts’ tenure as the Umpire and leader of the Court. 
